By Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd). (DefenceIndia Special)

BY sending heavily armed foreign mercenaries and army soldiers in civilian clothes across the Line of Control (LOC) into Kargil district of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) to physically occupy territory on the Indian side, Pakistan has added a new dimension to its ten year old 'proxy war' against India. Pakistan's provocative action has compelled India to launch a firm but measured and restrained military operation to clear the intruders. Operation Vijay, finely calibrated to limit military action to the Indian side of the LOC, includes air strikes from fighter ground attack (FGA) aircraft and attack helicopters. Even as the army and the Indian Air Force employ their synergised combat potential to eliminate the intruders and regain the territory occupied by them, it is important for the government to keep all channels of communication open and negotiate at the diplomatic and political levels with Pakistan to ensure that the Kargil conflict remains localised and Pakistan's military adventurism in Kargil is not allowed to escalate into a larger conflict.

The overall military cost of dislodging the well-entrenched intruders from the precipitous mountain ranges will undoubtedly be high. Two Indian Air Force FGA aircraft and one MI-17 helicopter have been lost to shoulder fired Stinger missiles (supplied by the CIA to Pakistan for distribution to the Afghan mujahideen, but furtively kept aside by the Pakistanis). The army has suffered heavy casualties with 144 personnel dead, 258 wounded and 9 missing, including two officers (upto 21 June 1999). Approximately 350 foreign mercenaries and Pakistan Army soldiers have been killed. Further air strikes and relentless artillery fire will undoubtedly take a still heavier toll.

What is the underlying cause behind this military misadventure? Clearly, the Pakistani military establishment had become increasingly frustrated with India's success in containing the militancy in J&K to within manageable limits. In the Kashmiri people's open expression of their preference for returning to normal life, the Pakistanis saw the evaporation of their hopes and desires to bleed India through a strategy of 'a thousand cuts'.

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's government appeared to be inclined to accept India's hand of friendship in keeping with the mood of popular opinion within Pakistan. It was committed to open up trade, liberalise the visa regime and encourage people-to-people, cultural and sports contacts. But Pakistan's military establishment was unable to come to terms with the fact that ten years of its concerted effort in destabilising India through a proxy war in J&K had yielded nothing (see box at end of article, 'Ten years of proxy war', for details). It was in such a scenario that the Pakistan Army and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate apparently decided to launch an organised intrusion into un-held remote areas of the Kargil sector to reignite the spark of militancy and gain moral ascendancy over the Indian security forces.

Even as Mian Nawaz Sharif was shaking hands with Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee at Lahore in February 1999, feverish activity was apace in Batalik, Kaksar, Mushko Valley and Dras areas of Kargil district to 'grab' territory on the Indian side of the LOC. During the period upto end April 1999, Pakistani regular troops and foreign mercenaries 'intruded' six to eight kilometres on the Indian side of the LOC and established themselves on the high mountain ridge lines at heights ranging between 15,000 to 18,000 feet.

These ridgelines in inaccessible remote areas which are mostly uninhabited are patrolled and kept under surveillance by Indian troops during the summer months. Pakistani regular forces have also followed the same patrolling practice in the corresponding areas on their side of the LOC. During winter it is well nigh impossible to survive in these areas unless Siachen-grade equipment is utilised. For over fifty years since the Indian and Pakistani armies have been at eyeball-to-eyeball contact along almost the entire length of the LOC in J&K, there has never been a dispute in these areas. Hence, Pakistan's present action in sending foreign mercenaries led by Pakistani regulars to occupy these areas is extremely provocative.

The extent of preparation suggests that the operation was meticulously planned and methodically executed over a long period by the Pakistan Army. Bunkers were built in a tactical manner on the mountains. Roads and tracks were extended from inside Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) to the ridges now occupied by the intruders and field artillery guns moved up. Stocks of ammunition, rations and other supplies were positioned. It is obvious that the intruders were prepared to build up the newly occupied areas into strong defensible positions when the first Indian patrols discovered their ingress on 6 May 1999. The intruders were well-supported by Pakistan's artillery and infantry posts along the LOC. Several light helicopters have flown back and forth between Pakistan's posts on its own side of the LOC and the positions occupied by the intruders inside Indian territory. The Pakistan Army has been entirely responsible for providing logistic support.

While the overall strategic aim of Pakistan in engineering these intrusions under the facade of Kashmiri militancy is obviously to provide a fresh impetus to the flagging jehad and once again attempt to focus international attention on the Kashmir issue, the military aims need to be considered more closely. In the Mushko Valley, Kaksar and Dras sectors the aim appears to have been to establish a 'firm base' from which traffic on the Srinagar-Leh highway could be disrupted at several places by trained mercenaries within a days return march from the firm base. The disruption of supplies to the Ladakh region along the Srinagar-Leh lifeline appears to have been a primary motive.

Another military aim was to open up a new route for infiltration into the Kashmir Valley and the Doda region south of the Pir Panjal range over the Amarnath mountains. In the Batalik and Turtuk Valley area which adjoins the Siachen glacial belt, the apprehension of trained mercenaries has revealed that the aim was to spread militancy to Ladakh through a spate of terrorist incidents designed to browbeat the simple Ladakhi people into submission and passive acquiescence, if not open support. The Pakistani Army had also planned to physically occupy a chunk of real estate to use as a bargaining counter subsequently, particularly in respect of negotiations for a mutual withdrawal from Siachen Glacier.

India's strong and swift military response has defeated Pakistan's larger aims. Operations to recapture high mountain ridges occupied by the intruders have proceeded as per plans, even though progress may appear to be slower than public opinion would desire it to be. However, it is important to leave operational planning to the professional soldiers so that unnecessary casualties are not sustained due to the pressure on the army to quickly eliminate the intruders. While it is difficult to set a date by which the sanctity of the LOC might be restored, what is certain is that there is a hard slogging match ahead. Many more officers and men will make the supreme sacrifice before every single intruder is evicted from the last ridge.

It is also certain that a large quantum of the additionally inducted force will have to be stationed along the LOC in Kargil district during the winter months of 1999-2000 to ensure that the Pakistani Army does not once again attempt to alter the LOC by force. At the time of writing, there are reports of another large build up of mercenary mujahideen in the Baltistan area of Pakistan occupied Kashmir (POK) waiting to be inducted across the LOC. As political and diplomatic negotiations may take time, Indian troops will have to hold onto their hard-earned gains through the winter months after the Zojila pass closes in mid-October 1999. Sustaining this deployment on the icy peaks along the LOC will undoubtedly be costly, but it is a price that has to be paid.

India also needs to acquire state-of-the-art satellite, aerial and ground surveillance systems to ensure against a repeat performance of Kargil '99. For too long has the nation been dependent on the grit, determination and indomitable courage of infantrymen to keep the peace on the borders and restore adverse situations. While battles will continue to be ultimately won by infantrymen launching physical assaults under withering enemy fire to capture tactically important features of terrain, the time has come to employ state-of-the-art military technology to safeguard India's territorial integrity.

The Indian Army's heroic efforts to recapture the high-altitude mountain ridges from Pakistan-sponsored intruders in the Batalik, Kaksar and Dras areas of Kargil district have dramatically highlighted the need for the early acquisition and deployment of sophisticated surveillance and early warning devices and precision strike munitions with the artillery and the Indian Air Force (IAF). The much-vaunted revolution in military affairs (RMA) must be exploited to deliver a devastating punch and reduce armed forces casualties.

As before, the Pakistanis had also planned to once again internationalise the Kashmir issue through their intervention in Kargil. Unfortunately for them their plan backfired and the international community, led by their long-time friend the United States, reacted adversely to their trans- LOC adventurism and called for an immediate pullback of their forces. During the G-8 summit at Cologne in the third week of June 1999, the world leaders also reiterated that both India and Pakistan should respect the LOC and resolve their problems bilaterally through dialogue. Though their statement on Kashmir stopped short of labelling Pakistan as an aggressor, it amounted to a strong indictment of Pakistan's transgression of the LOC.

The intrusions in Kargil district have resulted in a qualitative upgradation of the proxy war of the last ten years and are reflective of the desperation of the Pakistan Army and the ISI. India's response has once again been politically mature and militarily appropriate. The launching of air strikes is in keeping with the military requirement of achieving synergy in the employment of all available firepower resources to weaken and destroy the foreign mercenaries and regular Pakistani soldiers ingressing into the Indian side of the LOC in blatant disregard of the Shimla agreement of 1972 and in cynical violation of the spirit of the Lahore Declaration of 1999. In due course, the Indian Army will physically clear the intruders and the status quo ante will be restored. However, the larger issues raised by this wanton act, just short of actual aggression, need to be analysed and their long-term impact on the future of Indo-Pak relations assessed.

Either Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was informed of the impending action in Kargil district before he met Prime Minister Vajpayee and approved of it, or it was a purely Pakistan Army-isi operation and the civilian masters were kept in the dark. If Nawaz Sharif had approved of the operation in Kargil, he was obviously only paying lip service to better Indo-Pak relations during his summit meeting with the Indian prime minister. It then emerges that he is obviously a duplicitous person and cannot be trusted in future. A similar shadow must fall on the credibility of Pakistan's foreign policy establishment.

If the Pakistan Army and the ISI have carried out these elaborate intrusions without the prior approval of their prime minister, it is apparent that the civilian leadership does not count for much and that the army dictates Pakistan's foreign policy towards India. Either way, it is now clear that the army continues to call the shots in Pakistan and negotiating with the elected leadership of that country is likely to be futile and perhaps even counter-productive. Benazir Bhutto's recent admission that her Kashmir policy was wrong and that there is no alternative to peace with India, shows that there is a vertical split in political opinion within Pakistan on the Kargil intrusions. Even the Pakistani media has castigated the government for its ill-advised moves in Kargil.

Pakistan's military misadventure has gone horribly wrong. The world has refused to accept Pakistani propaganda that Kashmiri militants have 'infiltrated' across the LOC. Pakistan's Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz's disingenuous claim that the LOC was never clearly delineated has been strongly refuted by India and ignored by the international community. The Indian military and diplomatic response has stumped Pakistan. India has categorically stated that there can be no political negotiations with Pakistan till the intrusions in Kargil district are completely eliminated.

At the same time India has wisely desisted from 'opening up another front' along the LOC to hasten the eviction of the intruders, as some defence analysts and the media have advocated. Raising the ante at this stage can only be counter-productive in the long run as it will invariably lead to a larger conventional conflict which may spin out of control to a nuclear exchange, given the irrationality of the Pakistani military leadership that controls nuclear weapons. Also, the Indian economy, that is only now coming out of a long recession, would receive another jolt from which it may not recover for quite some time. India would also lose the goodwill it has earned as an aggrieved party on account of Pakistan's ill-considered trans- LOC operations.

While the situation in Kargil is gradually coming under control, India will need to be on guard against more such sinister operations being launched by the vengeful and devious military leadership of Pakistan with a hate-India mindset and the mentality of a primitive warlord. How else can one judge the Pakistani generals who obviously had no qualms in sending hundreds of their own soldiers and foreign mercenaries to their death in the pursuit of their nefarious goals? What is one to make of the brutal torture and dastardly mutilation of the bodies of prisoners of war? The government must send a clear message to the Pakistani leadership that there is a limit to India's patience and tolerance and it may be forced to consider harder options if there is no let-up in the relent-less proxy war being waged from across its western border by the Pakistan Army and the ISI.

The most important lesson to emerge from the ongoing Kargil '99 imbroglio is that a country cannot afford to let down its guard on matters as important as national security. The progressive decline in the defence budget since the process of economic liberalisation began about eight years ago, even as the threats from across the borders increased manifold, has drastically affected the ability of the armed forces to modernise and prepare for the type of war they are now being called upon to fight. The inescapable requirements of national security cannot be compromised, no matter what the cost. If 'eternal vigilance is the price of liberty', the price of vigilance need not be paid by sacrificing the blood of the nation's youth when military technology can perform the job equally well, if not better.

Ten years of proxy war

Since 1989, Pakistan has been waging a 'proxy war' against India by aiding and abetting Kashmiri militants to rise against the Indian state. Pakistan officially accepts that it is providing diplomatic, political and moral support to the militants. However, it is now internationally accepted that the Pakistan Army and the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate are providing military training, weapons, military equipment, ammunition and explosives to the militants, besides financial support. The isi spends approximately Rs 5 crore per month for its proxy war campaign. The Pakistan Army also actively supports the militants to infiltrate into Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) by engaging Indian posts along the routes of infiltration with artillery and small arms fire and provides a large number of regular officers to lead the militants.

In the first few years of militancy in the Kashmir Valley, upto 1992-93, the militants had received local sympathy due to the Kashmiri people's perceived grievances against the Indian state. However, it was never a grassroots movement and the Kashmiri people were soon disillusioned by the brutal un-Islamic terror tactics of the militants whose leadership had passed into the hands of mercenary mujahideen, inducted by Pakistan in large numbers to wage a jehad. These mercenaries were from Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Turkey and even Bosnia. They had anything but jehad on their minds. They exploited the power of the Kalashnikov to indulge in extortion, drinking orgies, womanising, forced weddings and even rape.

The systematic ethnic cleansing carried out at the behest of the ISI resulted in the forced migration of almost the entire Hindu population out of the Kashmir Valley into the Jammu region and other parts of India. This was contrary to Kashmir's sufi culture. The activities of the mercenaries caused immense resentment among the people and gradually the recruitment base of Kashmiri militants completely dried up. Also, concerted counter-insurgency operations conducted by the Indian Army and the other security forces, based on the increasing availability of real-time 'actionable' intelligence from the Kashmiri people, decimated the militants and brought the internal security situation under control in Kashmir Valley by 1995-96.

Frustrated in their efforts to create a popular uprising in Kashmir, the Pakistan Army-ISI-Jaamat e Islami combine then evolved a plan to spread the area of militancy to other parts of J&K and to the neighbouring states. From the summer months of 1996, a new phase of state-sponsored terrorism from across India's western border commenced in the Jammu Division of J&K. In a series of brutal massacres at Barshala, Parankot, Hinjan Gali, Surankot, Phagla, Chapnari, Horna, Kalaban, Chandi and Sailan, foreign mercenaries targeted the minority Hindu population with a view to destabilise the hitherto quiet areas of Doda, Punch, Rajauri and Udhampur south of the Pir Panjal range. The aim was clearly to create an ethnic divide so as to trigger an exodus of the Hindu population from these areas too. However, this diabolical attempt to change the demographic pattern of J&K through terror tactics was quickly thwarted by the Indian Army and other security forces.

Till end-March 1999, the army had killed 7,994 militants and another 24,251 had been apprehended in J&K. These included approximately 900 foreign mercenaries killed and 150 apprehended. Another 1,858 militants had surrendered. (These figures do not include the results achieved by the Border Security Force (BSF), the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and other central and state government security forces operating in J&K.) Army casualties included 1,005 killed and 3,017 wounded. 23,817 weapons of various sorts had been recovered from the militants. Pakistan-sponsored terrorism has claimed the lives of over 29,000 innocent civilians and rendered about 2,80,000 persons homeless. The loss to public and private property has been estimated at Rs 2,000 crore. Throughout this prolonged period of proxy war, India has shown tremendous restraint and immense tolerance in the face of grave provocation to its security. It is inconceivable that any other nation would have acted with the sense of responsibility that India has in not launching trans-Line of Control (LOC) operations to eliminate militant training camps and interdict known routes of infiltration.

By mid-1998, the security forces were in complete control of the situation in J&K and the state was rapidly returning to normal. Tourism was flourishing, industrial activity was gaining momentum, schools and colleges had once again opened up and political activity was being gradually revived. On the other hand, the Pakistan Army and ISI were becoming increasingly frustrated. In a last ditch attempt to rekindle the almost dead embers of militancy, the ISI pushed in a large number of foreign mercenaries (equipped with sophisticated arms and explosives and led mostly by Pakistan Army regulars) into J&K during the winter months of 1998-99 – a period that had been relatively quieter during previous years. Most of these mercenaries were neutralised in a number of fierce encounters with the security forces. Radio intercepts clearly revealed their handlers' increasing frustration at almost ten years of effort going inexorably waste. The Pakistan Army and the isi found it hard to accept that the Indian Army could conduct a successful counter-insurgency campaign using minimum force and showing an unprecedented tolerance in the face of mounting casualties. Clearly, the Pakistan Army and ISI planners were not willing to accept defeat and were bound to strike back in whatever manner they could. That opportunity was provided by the poor snowfall during the winter months of 1998-99 and the early heat wave that melted the snows earlier than expected in the Kargil district of Ladakh division of J&K.

(Reproduced with Permission from the Author, This is from the archives.)