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Brigadier
Rattan Kaul, 4/5 Gorkha Rifles {Frontier Force}
"Even God Lends a
Hand to Honest Boldness - Meanander ''
4/5 Gorkha Rifles {Frontier
Force} had fought two battles with Khukri {Khukri a sharp
edged long curved knife used by Gurkha's for killing in combat}
as the decisive weapon; wiped out Pakistani B Company 31 Punjab
at Atgram {Sylhet District - East Pakistan} on 20/21 November
1971 and caused disintegration of Company plus of Pakistani
22 Baluch at Gazipur, again Sylhet District, on night 4/5
December 1971. Battalion had suffered 7 officers, 3 Junior
Commissioned Officers {JCO's} and 92 Other Ranks {OR} killed/wounded
in these two battles. By afternoon of 5 December the battalion
had secured Kalaura, rail and road head leading to Sylhet,
one of the biggest North-eastern district of then East Pakistan
{Now Bangladesh}. Sylhet was a communication centre approachable
from four directions from India, important from military and
geographical point of view and its fall would be a severe
set back to the Pakistani's, with international repercussions.
Available intelligence information had interpreted that Sylhet
was lightly held as Garrison Brigade had been moved out in
the beginning of December 1971. Sylhet was thus selected as
the next objective of 8 Mountain Division, capture of which
would give a large chunk of territory. Sylhet Garrison, however,
was defended by Pakistan's 202 Infantry Brigade with its Headquarter
at Sylhet with two battalions {31 Punjab, 91 Mujahid} Company
12 Azad Kashmir Battalion, two Companies of EPCAF and half
Wing Frontier Corps supported by regiment of 105 millimetre
guns, a battery of 120 millimetre mortars. This brigade was
subsequently reinforced by Pakistani 313 Infantry Brigade
{22 Baluch, 30 Frontier Force, Wing Frontier Corps less two
companies} on 7/8 December 1971. This brigade was initially
covering/defending axis Shamsher Nagar - Maulvi Bazar. Both
the brigades had been deployed to cover all the major axes
and make Sylhet a fortress. By first week of December 1971,
Brigadier S A Hassan was sent to Sylhet and coordinate the
defensive battle of the two Pakistani Brigades.
On the evening of 6 December,
Lieutenant General Sagat Singh, GOC IV Corps gave out the
plan of heliborne landing of a battalion of 59 Mountain Brigade
{Brigadier CA Quinn} to occupy Sylhet. Major General {Later
General and COAS} K V Krishna Rao, GOC 8 Mountain Division
was also informed of the plans. On the morning of 7 Dec at
about 0900 hours Brigadier Quinn, Brigade Commander, visited
the battalion {4/5 GR {FF}} at Kalaura and informed Commanding
Officer {CO}, Lieutenant Colonel later Brigadier A B Harolikar,
MVC that the battalion is planned to be helilanded at Sylhet,
reported to be devoid of regular troops, on the same afternoon,
with link up by ground forces within 12-24 hours. CO though
felt that Sylhet was not vacated and was possibly strongly
held, link up with 12-24 hours was difficult in view of the
nodal points of Pakistani defences en-route, slow progress
of own ground forces so far and distances to be traversed
to Sylhet. By about 10 AM, 7 Dec, Brigadier Quinn, CO {Harolikar},
Group Captain {Later Air Marshal} Chandan Singh, in charge
of the helicopter unit, flew over Sylhet in a helicopter and
selected a suitable landing site near Mirpara on the Northern
bank of the Surma River, about 2 kilometres East of the Railway
Bridge. No military activity was noticed nor was reconnaissance
helicopter fired upon, thus somewhat confirming belief that
Pak 202 Infantry Brigade had left Sylhet. CO also felt, after
the reconnaissance, that his apprehensions 'may' have been
unfounded. However, he was to prove right in the time to come;
unknown Pakistani's had increased its strength to two brigades
at Sylhet. On CO's return the following was the plan of the
operations. Landing zone at Mirpara on the outskirts of Sylhet,
close to railroad bridge over Surma River; Flight of MI -
4 Helicopters available with a flight time of 25 to 30 minutes
with approximately 50 persons per wave. Charlie Company under
Major {Later Colonel} Malik {Maney Malik} to be first wave
followed by Bravo {Captain VK Sharma {Sharma}}, Alfa {Major
Dinesh Rana {Dinesh}} and Delta {Captain V K Salgotra {Salgotra}.First
wave to take off between 1400-1430 Hours, 7 December from
Kalaura so that entire battalion landed before last light.
First to land in Sylhet at 1500 hours was major portion of
Charlie {C} Company led by Maney Malik and were fired upon
by Pakistani troops with mounted machine guns. They went straight
charging in the direction from where the firing was coming,
with war cry of ' Ayo Gorkhali'. {War Cry of the Unit}. After
about 40-45 minutes second wave consisting of remaining part
of C Company CO' s party and a portion of B Company landed
.
The total force at this stage
consisted of 90-100 persons, 15 Light Machine Guns {LMG's}
and 4 Medium Machine Guns {MMG's}. With this landing of troops
control and denial of the landing area and area around became
crucial for subsequent flights to land.No further flights
arrived for crucial next 12 hours, leaving already landed
troops to bitterly fight throughout the night, to retain the
toe hold. Major Mumtaz Hussain Shah of 31 Punjab, Pakistan
Army, who was responsible for the local defence around Southern
portion of Sylhet Town reported landing of 400-500 men to
his headquarters. He attributes possible objectives of this
force to capture of 'Y' Junction South of Sylhet and the Rail
Bridge intact which could have cut off withdrawal route of
31 Punjab and also denied 313 Pak Brigade entry to the town
from the South for eventual Sylhet Fortress battle. The fire
fights around the landing ground continued through the night.
Just at the beginning of dawn, at about 0400 hours, Alfa and
Delta Company landed amidst artillery fire and by the break
of the day the battalion had concentrated. Pakistanis interpreted
this additional flight of helicopters as landing of remainder
part of the brigade. In the twilight hours of 8 Dec, came
two mountain guns {75/24mm} and B Company 9 Guards. The dilemma
now was to either go for compact defended area or a wider
aggressive one; both with disadvantages and disadvantages.
The CO opted for later for occupying wider defensive positions
around landing site, conduct offensive defence by laying ambushes,
raid enemy localities, establish roadblocks to cut off road
communication and harass Pakistanis. An hour or so after last
light Pakistani's launched a counter attack on Alfa and Delta
Company's which was repulsed.
On 9 December, a helicopter
flight brought Major {Later Major General} Ian Cardozo, AVSM,
SM on posting after the Staff Course. Major {Later Brigadier
Rattan Kaul, on discharge from hospital, also arrived in the
same flight and straightaway went forward to his company {Delta}.
During the day a composite patrol led by Major Maney Malik
laid ambush on road Sylhet - Khadim Nagar and ambushed Pakistani
Convoy, creating chaos as drivers abandoned vehicles and ran
away. During a chance wireless interception by Kaul some information
was obtained. To quote CO {Harolikar} on this; " From
a wireless transmission intercepted by Major Kaul it was clear
that 313 Infantry Brigade had arrived in Sylhet on 7 Dec and
along with 202 Infantry Brigade and {sick} were planning an
attack with five companies on Alfa and Delta Company's, which
were posing a serious threat to the bridge, besides also being
a road block". Half an hour after last light came this
counter attack with artillery support on Alfa {Dinesh} and
Delta {Kaul} Company's, which was also repulsed.
On 11 December morning three
Hunters, directed by FAC Flt Lt S C Sharma, engaged enemy
positions in front of Alfa and Delta Company's. All these
days link up by ground forces was expected same evening; apparently
based on the information from advancing forces. This continued
to be so even after next three days; till 14 December. With
the changing situation, mounting casualities, orders for compact
deployment, after last light 11 December, were given. At last
light Pakistanis launched a counter attack on A and D Company's,
which was beaten back, in which senior JCO of A Company was
killed and Major Kaul, Company Commander D Company, seriously
injured. The readjustment which had to be put on hold due
to Paki counterattack took place only after the situation
had stabilised. On 14 December, after last light, a weak section
of 6 Rajput reached the battalion across Surma River, though
the battalion was still away. However, guns of our formation
could now support us and replenishment by air had improved
ammunition state.
Unknown to us Pakistani's realising
their predicament had its effect. The events that unfolded
now on was a chapter of glory and best narrated in CO's {Harolikar}
own words. "However on 15 December morning we faced an
intriguing, but interesting incident. That day, in the morning,
I received a radio message from Major Malik {Maney - Charlie
Company Commander}, who informed me that there was a large
visible concentration of enemy troops about 800 meters in
front of his FDL {Forward Defended Locality} and that there
were couple of white flags {indicative of surrender} in the
hands of some of the persons
." A group of 1000-1500
ith two officers came and handed over a note, which stated
that the station commander of Sylhet wanted to surrender the
entire garrison of Sylhet. We informed them that their Brigadier
himself needs to come over along with one more officer to
discuss further details. The two officers turned back At around
3 PM the Pakistani Station Commander { Hassan} met Brigade
Commander Brigadier Quinn at the bridge and worked out the
details of the surrender. It is interesting to note that this
happened 24 hours earlier than the official acceptance of
surrender by the Pakistani forces on 16 Dec at 1655 hours
at Dacca and even prior to the temporary cease fire".
The battalion had endured and entered 9th day and 8th night,
fourcounter attacks repulsed, a determined Commanding Officer
and the Khukri yielding troops transforming CO's vision into
reality with no link up except elements of 6 Rajput having
reached the South Bank of Surma River.
Pak Deployment and Line of Own Forces As on 15 December
The modalities of surrender completed it was decided to have
proper surrender next morning {16 December} when entire Sylhet
Garrison comprising of 3 Brigadiers, 1 Colonel, 107 officers,
219 JCO's and 6190 Pakistani soldiers and 39 non-combatants
surrendered. During the battle of Sylhet {between 7 and 16
December) 1 officer (Major Karan Puri, Adjutant) 2 JCO's {Subedar
Karne Thapa, A Company and Naib Subedar Bhim Singh Khatri,
Signal Platoon} and 11 other ranks made the supreme sacrifice,
while 3 officers {Cardozo, Kaul and Malik} and 36 other ranks
were wounded. At the time of surrender of the Sylhet Garrison,
battalion strength in Sylhet consisted of about 6- 7 officers,
10-15 JCO's and about 300 -350 soldiers.
After the surrender by Pakistanis, Brigadier S A Hassan,
Pakistani Garrison Commander of Sylhet, paid compliments to
the battalion, when he mentioned to Brigadier Quinn that "If
this battalion {4/5 GR{FF}} was not there we would have fought
for at least another 10 days" . After the surrender troops
entered the town and saw heaps of weapons thrown all along
the road. It is during this move Ian Cardozo was injured by
a mine blast and lost his left lower leg.
For this outstanding first ever heliborne operation
of Indian Army by 4/5 Gorkha Rifles {Frontier Force}, Sylhet
was awarded as Battle Honour and East Pakistan, 1971 as Theatre
Honour to 4/5 Gorkha Rifles {Frontier Force}.
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