Shaken to the core by the overwhelming election victory of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's Awami League in late 1970, the Pakistan Army let loose a reign of terror in East Pakistan. An unprecedented exodus of Bengali refugees commenced as a result, and millions crossed the border and flooded the Indian states of Tripura, Assam and Bengal. Not only was our economy affected but so was the demographic balance. Attempts at reconciliation, negotiations, and international pressures of diplomacy were repeatedly tried but came to nought. By October 1971, war seemed inevitable.

In 1965, much of the usable strength of the Indian Army had been tied down by bellicose Chinese mutterings of intent. It was realized then, that in any future conflict with Pakistan, the Chinese angle had to be neutralized. In 1971, therefore, as the war clouds between India and Pakistan built up, India realized that, should a war situation in the East become unavoidable, a defensive front had to be maintained against China in the north. The weather could also be made an ally if the operations were planned for winter, when the high Himalayan passes between India and China become snow-bound. Combat formations could then be selectively withdrawn from the north for operations elsewhere. This was case North.

Case East

In October 1971, when war with Pakistan seemed inevitable, a choice had to be made on how to use the strategic infantry reserve formations. The mountain divisions committed to counter-insurgency in the north-east of the country became natural choices to reinforce reserve formations for the Eastern theatre. Two other divisions held centrally had now to be allocated to either the Eastern or the Western theatres.

Pakistan had frequently reiterated that the defence of East Pakistan (separated by 1,600 kilometres of Indian territory) lay in the West - any gains by the Indian Army in the East would be offset by purposeful gains by Pakistan in the West, after which negotiations would restore the status quo. As a sensible and pragmatic strategy this could not be faulted.

But the missing element in this strategy in the current state of affairs, was that the people of East Pakistan no longer wanted the status quo to be re-established. On this fact alone, as in 1965, Pakistan once more stood defeated.

The Indian Army merely provided the coup de grace to what the people of Bangladesh had commenced-active resistance to the Pakistani Government and its Armed Forces on their soil.

The Indian Army, therefore, allocated its strategic reserves in infantry to the East with a proviso that a swift campaign was to be mounted after (or even during) which formations would commence a shift to the West, if necessary. The political aim was restricted to the return of a vast refugee population of East Bengalis then residing in India.

The strategy that was aimed at, and achieved, was principally one of applying the full weight of force against East Pakistan while conducting a holding operation in the West through an offensive-defence strategy. Concurrently, the Chinese were to be immobilized through diplomacy and choice of timing of the operation. That this strategy succeeded speaks volumes for India's political leadership headed by the late Mrs Indira Gandhi, its military leadership headed by General (later Field Marshal) SHFJ Manekshaw and the backing of the Indian masses.

On 3 December 1971, Pakistan taking the initiative struck at airfields both in the East and the West. While the IAF carried out retaliatory air strikes in the West, and shot the Pakistan Air Force (PAP) out of the skies in the first 72 hours in Army mounted a multi-corps, multi-pronged attack on East Pakistan. Isolated by distance, with no hope of reinforcements from the home forces due to an effective Indian naval maritime blockade of East Pakistani ports, and no air support the results were a foregone conclusion!

The Pakistan Army in the East fought isolated, incoherent battles of survival. Their hope, the only one, of great-power intervention (and that even physically) miscarried. The Chinese moves in the North were brushed aside by the Indian leadership. A task force from the US Seventh Fleet, having sailed into the southern reaches of the Bay of Bengal, quietly moved out to the South Arabian Sea, once surrender of the Pakistani forces under General AAK Niazi seemed inevitable.

The Indian Army's biggest impediment were the many rivers it had to cross to achieve its objectives. River lines were generally well defended. Crossings were effected in captured country craft, ferries, tugs and improvised contraptions. In the dash to Dacca (now Dhakay, 4 Corps lead formations crossed the river Meghna in helicopters. Infantry attacks were designed to present an all-pervading threat in terms of direction and isolation of Pakistani formations holding strong point and nodal point defences. At the tactical level, Pakistani battle groups, and in some cases, formations gave a good account of themselves. The younger lot of officers and men proved to be worthy foes. The higher level leadership was suspect. Case East, and indeed the complete grand strategy behind the operations in 1971, is an example of a political objective obtained by military projection of power. There was no doubt of India's mature and inspiring leadership at the political and military levels. The field forces conducted 'lightning campaigns' which brought in spectacular results with minimum effort. Many of the lessons of 1965, learnt within the fog of modern combat uncertainties, were put to good use.

Case West

In the 1971 War, for the firsttime, the Western front was given secondary priority. India's strategy in the West was to conduct a holding operation, with limited offensives on this front. Common wisdom dictated this. In reality, India's overall strategic posture still remained defensive and to that end the West retained its overwhelming strategic priority in the scheme of things.

This time round Pakistan's outlook towards Kashmir was glazed. Being 'disputed' territory its bargaining value was appreciated as being nowhere near that of Indian territory captured, say, in Jammu, the Punjab or in Rajasthan. As events proved, however, Kashmir was not left out of Pakistan's offensive plans. Pakistan planned four offensive actions across India's north-western borders over a 1,000 kilometre front. Of these, three were launched and one was aborted. Taken together, these did form a pattern of sorts.

The northernmost attack in division strength came on Punch in Kashmir. Another divisional thrust came in once again at Chhamb, a repeat of its operational plan of 1965. The main offensive to be launched by its 1 Armoured Division supported by 7 Infantry Division was held poised in the middle sector opposite Fazilka-Ganganagar. The southernmost was possibly a spoiling attack, mounted by a brigade group, aimed at Ramgarh in Rajasthan. Unannounced but not unheeded, remained the question of its Northern Reserve strike combination - 6 Armoured and 17 Infantry Divisions.

Pakistan's relative inaction can perhaps be ascribed to command ambivalence to conserve strength over time -a fallout of their 1965 experience - and to gauge the true Indian intention with regard to the Indian Army's military objectives in the Pakistani heartland.

It lost an opportunity in mid-October when India's sole uncommitted reserve grouping ( 1 Armoured and 14 Infantry Divisions) had not been allowed 'provocative forward concentration' in the hope that a last-minute worldwide diplomatic effort would allow for a situation to develop in East Pakistan in which the refugee masses could go back in safety and honour.

Pakistan's overall offensive design has been subjected to great debate - as to which attacks were spoiling in nature, and which diversionary. There was no doubt about the main effort.Indian offensive operational plans were designed to give tactical viability to its main defensive effort.

General Officer Commanding-in-Chief Western Command's responsibilities were vast. He was responsible for a front extending from Ladakh through Kashmir, Jammu, Punjab and finally ending in Rajasthan from where Southern Command took over operational control. It was a frontage of Approximately 1,600 kilometers, consisting of high-altitude terrain,hills and forests, obstacle-ridden plains and semi-desert and desert areas.

Intense tactical-level battles developed in Chhamb (once again), in Fazilka, and, in the closing stages of the war, on the approaches to Zafarwal. West of Shakargarh, the Indian 1 Corps had gone into a slow deliberate advance, with a view to keep Pakistani reserve formations on the edge of indecision.

On balance, both armies evened out in tactical honours. The Chhamb attack succeeded in forcing a hard-fought withdrawal of the forward Indian brigade group. In turn, an infantry brigade bridgehead on the Basantar river reinforced by 17 (Poona) Horse, ably assisted by 4 [Hodsons] Horse, brought Pakistan's 8 (Independent) Armoured Brigade to a virtual standstill when it counter-attacked in dire straits.

The very large mobile reserve formations on both sides waited for a decisive move by the opponent. By 13 December everything became somewhat academic as the Indian 2 Corps and the bulk of 50 (Independent) Parachute Brigade shifted their main weight from the east to the west and took over operational responsibility south of the Sutlej in the Punjab.

In Southern Command's zone of operations, one divisional advance was 'spoilt! by a Pakistani brigade group (two Armoured Regiments in action), mentioned earlier. The second divisional thrust 250 kilometres further south made headway against desultory opposition till brought up short by reinforcements rushed into the sector, while it was facing considerable logistic difficulties.The great depth of the Thar desert once again imposed its timeless friction.

In the wake of the Indo-Pak War of 1971, the Indian Army emerged as a force to reckon with. Before that, it was perceived at a level lower than 'dissuasive', especially after 1962. It used to be thought, that it had mass but not a velocity component; that it was turgid and ponderous. It took a swift decisive campaign of movement over unfavourable terrain to bring home to people who watch these things, that the Army had arrived as a first class deterrent conventional combined-arms force.