politicians; but, frequently, they have engaged in the random mass killing of ordinary Hindu civilians. This year has witnessed a dramatic increase in the number of attacks and fatalities.[29]

India has been troubled by sectarian violence for decades, reflecting a constant conflict between its federal system and ethnic and regional aspirations.[30] Ethnic unrest and rebel violence have been major Indian security concerns since the Chinese-aided Naga and Mizo separatist insurgencies flared in the 1960s.[31] But the recent growth and expansion of terrorism across the nation strikes at the very heart of India's Constitution and democratic system. While hit-and-run attacks have declined in the northeast (except in Tripura state), terrorist violence has in recent years spread to the hills of Darjeeling, the plains of Tamil Nadu and the farms of Punjab. Groups blamed for terrorist attacks in India include the exiled Tamil militants from Sri Lanka, Gurkha nationalists, Kashmiri Moslem fundamentalists and Tripura tribal rebels. Several Sikh groups have helped turn the rich farms of Punjab into India's "killing fields." They include the Khalistan Commando Force, the Babbar Khalsa, the All-India Sikh Students Federation, the Khalistan Liberation Army, the Dal Khalsa and the Dashmesh Regiment. At least two of these groups, the Babbar Khalsa and the Dashmesh Regiment, are believed to be active overseas, particularly in Canada and West Germany.[32]

Terrorism in Pakistan

Pakistan has likewise been wracked by ethnic and sectarian conflict. The unrest has been sparked by what is perceived by ethnic and linguistic minorities like the Sindhis, Baluchis and Pathans to be a Punjabi stranglehold over the government, military and economy. The Shiite sect has also been restive.

The secession of the Bengali -speaking East Pakistan in 1971 was a result of the failure of the national leadership to integrate the country's five main ethnic communities into a cohesive federal system. The dominance of the military in national politics and the absence of democratic institutions through which regional and ethnic aspirations could be articulated have fostered alienation and unrest among minorities, who believe they have little say in political decision-making. The Punjabi military-bureaucratic oligarchy, however, has failed to respond to the aspirations of the minority groups or "draw the necessary lessons" from East Pakistan's secession.[33] The "Jiye Sind" movement has been pursuing an underground secessionist campaign. Pakistan's turbulent domestic politics has also helped fuel violence in society. There has been a sharp rise in ethnic disturbances and terrorist attacks, and hundreds have been slain this year alone.

The use of Pakistan as a base by several Afghan guerrilla organizations and the arrival of millions of Afghan refugees have helped aggravate internal strife. Western nations have funneled hundreds of millions of dollars worth of sophisticated weapons through Pakistan to the Afghan rebels, but large quantities of the supplies have found their way into underground Pakistani arms markets. Elements in the Pakistani Army, police and the refugee administration are still operating scams to sell weapons and relief supplies for personal gain.[34]
The easy availability of advanced weapons, including rockets, grenades and automatic rif les, has helped increase criminal and terrorist activity in Pakistani society in recent years. This is evident from the recent explosion of terrorist violence in Sind province, where gun-wielding Sindhi and Muhaj ir militants left more than 245 people dead in a two-day orgy of bloodletting.[35] The induction of large quantities of deadly arms in society is bound to undermine law and order and have serious long-term social and political consequences. one result has been that Pakistan has already become a major arms-purchase center and base for international terrorists, particularly from the Middle East. The seizure of a Pan Am jetliner at Karachi airport in September 1986 by suspected Abu Kidal terrorists, in which more than 20 people, mostly of Indian descent, died, was testimony to that.

In 1987, 17 percent of the 832 incidents of international terrorism recorded in the world occurred in Pakistan alone; if Pakistan is excluded, the level of international terrorism actually declined by almost 10 percent last year from the 1986 level.[36] The U.S. government blames Soviet-trained agents of the Afghan WAD intelligence service of carrying out 127 of the 138 international terrorism strikes in Pakistan last year, leaving 234 people dead and 1,200 wounded. That toll is about half of the total casualties in international terrorism attacks worldwide in 1987. Several terrorist strikes by Iranian and Palestinian agents in Pakistan have been reported. A devastating explosion at the Ojheri ammunition dump, believed to be the work of saboteurs, left hundreds dead or wounded last April, underlining the growing menace of terrorism in Pakistan. Last year in July, 70 Pakistanis were killed and 200 wounded when two car bombs, probably planted by WAD agents, exploded in a crowded Karachi market.

Pakistan's strategic relations with the United States and the presence of many Arab and other Moslem radicals on its soil have made it a good location for staging terrorist attacks on U.S. and other targets. Three of the WAD attacks in Pakistan were "apparently aimed at U.S. targets."[37] Despite the traditionally close relations between the United States and Pakistan, there has been an underlying current of anti-U.S. hostility in the Pakistani society. This manifested itself in 1980 when demonstrators burned down the American embassy in Islamabad. The rise of terrorist violence has prompted fortress- like security at the U.S. embassy in Islamabad, and also at the embassy in New Delhi, where several diplomats have been attacked by unidentified gunmen in recent years.[38]

A problem with analyzing terrorism and its wider implications for any region is that one community's or nation's terrorists can often be "martyrs" or "freedom fighters" for a rival sect, group or government. This is exactly what helps nurture terrorism. This paper does not judge the merits of any group's political or sectarian demands, but focuses on the potential threat to nuclear facilities from organizations waging campaigns of mass terror. Terror includes deliberate, indiscriminate killing of civilians. In South Asia, terrorism appears to draw its strength from several factors.

1. Ability of groups to work across national frontiers. Because international frontiers in South Asia were drawn by colonial rulers without due consideration of natural geographic boundaries or national security interests, they are difficult to patrol. When subject to hot pursuit, or out of choice, terrorists often are able to easily cross national borders. Some groups have sanctuaries across the frontiers. Insurgents in India's northeast frequently flee through porous borders into Burma or Bangladesh. Sri Lankan Tamil militants cross the narrow Palk Straits separating their island from south India in boats despite Indian naval patrols. Sikh terrorists in Punjab escape to Pakistan through the flat border. Afghan gunmen of all political hues move across their country's frontier with Pakistan at will. The growth of transborder terrorism in south Asia carries an inherent danger of extremists inflicting casualties on people of different nationality or ethnic identity. In Sri Lanka, for example, we now have two opposing militant groups, the Tamil "militants" and the Marxist Janatha Vimukhti Peramuna (People's Liberation Front), whose current campaigns of violence are motivated by a common feeling: deep resentment of Indian pressure and domination. Trans-border terrorism also has serious nuclear terrorism implications because "perpetrators may not be inhibited from committing nuclear violence against foreign populations."[39]

2. Technological sophistication. Groups engaged in terrorist violence in India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka are armed with highly sophisticated, offensive weapons. Despite a year of intense fighting, the Indian Peace-Keeping Force in Sri Lanka has failed to subdue well-armed Tamil rebels. Sikh extremists are armed with AK-47 assault rifles and other weapons that are often more sophisticated than those handled by the Punjab police. Indian police sources have been quoted as saying that the militants may have recently also acquired rockets. The terrorist bands in Pakistan are also much better armed than police.

The illicit sale of some of the advanced weapons intended for Afghan anti-Marxist rebels to extremist groups in Pakistan, India and Sri Lanka has made the task of combating terrorism in South Asia very difficult. The induction of hundreds of millions of dollars worth of sophisticated arms for the Afghan rebels, and the movement and use of large quantities of those weapons beyond the originally intended frontiers, are going to leave a long-lasting scar on some societies in South Asia. Any new government in Kabul would face a major law-and-order problem, and there is a potent danger that bands or organizations dissatisfied with the powersharing arrangement may resort to terror campaigns.[40] But it is the flow of these arms into the hands of terrorist elements in Pakistan and India that is a cause of immediate concern. The illicit trade in these weapons could make Pakistan a potential shopping center for terrorists from the Middle East, West Europe and elsewhere.

3. State sponsorship for terror. The growth of international terrorist movements has been linked to the willingness of some nations to directly or indirectly sponsor campaigns of terror, often through proxies and other means.41 State sponsorship of groups has strained relations between India and Pakistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan, and Sri Lanka and India. India's Naga and Mizo insurgents received training in China, but the military assistance ended after the death of Chinese leader Mao Tse- tung. Indian allegations that Pakistan is training and arming Sikh dissidents have cast a deepening shadow over earlier tentative efforts to improve bilateral relations between the two nations.

Pakistan denies assisting Sikhs. The Western and Pakistani markings on weapons seized by the Indian security forces from Sikh militants suggest another possibility: that they were possibly purchased by the extremists from an underground Pakistani arms market and smuggled into India. Pakistan and India have now agreed to a new border-patrolling scheme aimed at curbing the movement of militants. Pakistan earlier had accused India of aiding the now defunct Al-Zulfikar group, which hijacked a Pakistani airliner to Kabul. India had provided sanctuary to Sri Lankan Tamil rebels before it changed policy and signed a peace settlement with Colombo last year.

4. Drug-dealing. Although extortion, "protection" fees and bank robberies are important means to finance terror, drugtrafficking is beginning to play a key role -- one that conceivably could bring an organization the financial means needed to acquire nuclear material for nuclear blackmail and terror. Pakistan and Afghanistan are major narcotics suppliers to the West, and terrorist groups are seeking a large slice of this lucrative commerce since they are better equipped to face the high risks that are involved. Sikh militants are reported to have engaged in drugfor-weapon barters in Pakistan, and arrests of some Tamils overseas indicate profits from drug- dealing were probably pumped into the insurgent campaign.

5. Halo of martyrdom. The willingness of political extremists to undertake suicidal terrorist missions reflects the phenomenon of "holy terror."[42] Admiration of "martyrs" is widespread among disaffected groups or sects in the Middle East and South Asia. The halo of martyrdom that surrounds terrorist elements is a key factor in the brutal killings of civilian bystanders or other actions aimed at creating mass terror. It also could play a role in a suicidal truck-bomb attack on a nuclear reactor, in the takeover and sabotage of a reactor or in other potential acts of atomic terror or blackmail.
Trends in terrorism indicate that South Asian nations will have to devote larger resources and high-level attention to the tasks of combating political violence in the next few years. The character and level of terrorist violence calls for increased investments in physical-protection systems at nuclear installations. Close monitoring of shipments of nuclear materials, rigorous surveillance of nuclear facilities and installation of updated anti-sabotage systems would help to deter atomic terrorism.

Risks of nuclear terrorism appear relatively high in South Asia for three reasons.
1. The extreme, civilian-targeted nature of terrorism. Several groups are defining their enemies in a very broad sense: any members belonging to a rival community, sect or organization. The brutalization of violence is reflected in the indiscriminate targeting of such people in terrorist bombings, shootings or ambushes. This facet of South Asian terrorism should be of the greatest concern to officials involved in building protection systems for nuclear plants and weapons- usable materials. It is conceivable that a terrorist band may target a nuclear reactor located away from their main area of operation in a region populated by those that they classify as "enemies." There are many nuclear sites in India and Pakistan that could be so defined by indigenous extremists or by trans-border terrorists.

Terrorists everywhere in the world have little regard for the safety of civilians and many groups sanction the killing of ordinary citizens. But unlike the mass ethnically-oriented targeting of civilians carried out by several South Asian groups, most terrorist organizations elsewhere attempt to select their targets of attacks with a degree of discrimination. This is true of the Latin American terrorists or Spain's Basques (who conducted a series of attacks on a nuclear company[43]) or West Germany's Red Army Faction, which targeted NATO facilities and weapons manufacturers. Even the Irish Republican Army or the Palestinian groups that have left many civilians dead by their actions have not used tactics of mass targeting of members of particular communities.

The belief that terrorist groups would not target nuclear installations or try to steal weapons-usable materials for fear of arousing mass anger in society may be valid to some extent if the terrorists are widely seen as sensitive to public reaction and are selective and discriminatory in their tactics, although it is not difficult to conceive of several situations where extremists operating beyond their national frontiers may be tempted to create a major crisis and disaster by sabotaging an atomic facility. However, in situations where enemies are defined very broadly by underground groups, the specter of nuclear terrorism within national borders seems real. The technology of terrorism has become sophisticated, and such a strike is possible. Recent innovations in technology, like the Semtex explosives and fuses that can delay detonation of homemade bombs by more than two weeks, may provide new opportunities to political extremists waging campaigns of terror.

A bomb attack on a nuclear facility could be motivated by a group's desire to undermine citizens' confidence in their own government, damage the political credibility of the ruling leadership and unleash a general reign of terror in society. Sabotage, carried out with "insider" support, is also possible because potential saboteurs can learn techniques of destruction. wisdom lies in stemming such a danger with concrete, defense-in-depth measures. Some Sikh militants arrested in the United States told authorities that they had received paramilitary training to blow up a reactor in India; however, little evidence on that purported plan eventually emerged.

2. Availability of portable weapon systems. Another reason for concern about nuclear terrorism in South Asia is the growing availability of powerful and portable weapon systems that potentially can be used to attack nuclear installations. These weapons include surface-to-air rockets (like the shoulder- fired Stinger missiles) and anti-tank rockets. The danger from such weapons to nuclear installations is particularly high in Pakistan.

However, the difficulty in patrolling the India- Pakistan frontier effectively implies that terrorist elements in India could acquire these portable systems, and it might be possible that some of them may already have them. Sri Lankan Tamil fighters, whose links with India's Tamil Nadu state remain unsevered, are armed with sophisticated rockets. The unauthorized purchase of Stingers by Qatar,[44] and possibly by Iran, from third parties underlines the problems in preventing diversion of missiles and other powerful weapons intended for Afghan rebels. There has been concern in the U.S. Congress that these rocket systems could become deadly instruments of terrorism.

3. The internationalization of domestic terrorism. Another reason for concern is that underground groups are establishing links with other organizations overseas for purposes of training, procuring arms and receiving funds. Sikh and Tamil militants, for example, are connected to several groups in the West, and some Tamil "Tigers" are said to have received training from the PLO. These groups of coreligionists serve as overseas fund-raisers, and also provide sanctuary to fugitives. Two Sikh extremists accused of murder in India are awaiting in a U.S. jail the outcome of extradition hearings,[45] while in Canada authorities have cracked down on Sikhs suspected of aiding the Punjab extremists.

Overseas connections can help domestic terrorists to learn new tactics of terror and obtain technology for nuclear-related terrorism. Because no region can be insulated from terrorism trends in another part of the world, advanced technologies of terrorism, like detonation of explosives by remote control, can readily be transferred to new groups. The outlawed JVP in Sri Lanka has demonstrated how new tactics of terror and sophisticated weapons can easily be acquired. There is also the danger that the large human traffic and close relations between South Asia and the Middle East might spur ominous links between international terrorists in the Middle East and South Asian extremists.

Resort to nuclear terrorism may be particularly tempting to older terrorist movements that have been effectively countered and that may be prepared to attempt a "terrorism spectacular" to regain prominence.[46] The longer terrorists are involved in underground campaigns, the more brutal and hardened they tend to become. And the greater is their desperation to attract national and international attention to their cause. Such terrorists might have few inhibitions in sabotaging a nuclear facility or resorting to weapons of mass destruction like biological or chemical arms.
Acceptance of legitimate political demands of a group may help in cutting off much of its grassroots support but not necessarily help end attacks on civilians and others who could be used as pawns. It is often difficult to draw the line separating terrorism from criminal activity. Bank raids, extortion by threat and terrorist- imposed levies often provide extremists a good living. Even after many of a group's original demands have been fulfilled, underground extremists may still practice violence because the skills they acquired in a career of terrorism cannot be transferred easily to any profession other than crime.[47] It might not be realistic to expect hardened terrorists to lay down arms and move to other occupations; often original demands are revised or expanded or new issues are given precedence in a way that continues to fuel the cycle of violence.

Also, the general tendency toward centralization and personalization of political authority in South Asian countries has increased the inability of state structures to accomodate ethnic concerns,[48] fueling unrest and violence. Political leaders should continue to search for solutions to the problems of terrorism in South Asia, but it would be only over-optimism to expect an early end to those problems.

IV. OVERVIEW OF NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH ASIA

The expansion of the nuclear programs in India and Pakistan calls for new measures to protect facilities and weapons-usable material. Such materials need to be physically protected in the same way as nuclear weapons, and should be moved from one site to another only under extraordinary security. The development of uranium enrichment in Pakistan is shrouded in secrecy, but most experts agree that Pakistan has the capability or has already succeeded in producing weapons-grade uranium. In India, commercial reprocessing and recycle of plutonium in the civilian program will increase substantially in the 1990s, making the task of material protection onerous.

Naturally, the question that arises is: What strategies have been adopted in India and Pakistan to deal with the threat of nuclear terrorism and blackmail? In India, a National Emergency Response Committee, set up following the Chernobyl disaster, has drawn up emergency evacuation plans to safeguard nuclear plants, their employees and the general public.[49] However, the so-called "Emergency Preparedness Plans" that were belatedly drawn up are geared to tackle accidents, not to deal with sabotage or a terrorist strike on a facility. However, some of the new safety features now being incorporated into the nuclear plants under construction would help in containing the effects of a deliberate release of radiation by saboteurs. The features include double containment walls designed to trap radioactive releases within a reactor, an emergency cooling system, an automatic shutdown system and a fail-safe design.[50] However, the plants currently in operation do not have all these safety features. It was only after Prime minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Kalpakkam in early 1988 that the Indian government ordered that no new nuclear reactor be approved without emergency evacuation plans,[51] which have been in force in most countries for many years. In Pakistan, too, the Atomic Energy Commission has sought to deal with the issue of an accidental release of radiation but not specifically with the question of nuclear sabotage or an attack from weapon.[52]
This section outlines the current atomic construction activities and the nuclear expansion plans for the next 12 years in India and Pakistan in the context of the growing dangers of nuclear terrorism and blackmail in South Asia. The expansion of the nuclear programs in the two rival countries would place heavy burdens of safety and security responsibilities on authorities.

Nuclear Development in India
India has launched an ambitious civilian nuclear expansion program. The aim is to raise the installed nuclear power capacity to 10,000 MWe by the year 2000. At present, six nuclear power reactors with a total capacity of 1,230 MWe are in operation at Tarapur, Rawatbhata and Kalpakkam. Eight new Indian-designed CANDU reactors, each of 235 MWe, are currently under construction at four sites: Narora, Kaiga, Kakrapar and Rawatbhata. Work on four more reactors of 235-MWe size and six 500-MWe reactors is scheduled to begin after 1990.[53] India's nuclear plans also call for the completion of six additional 500-MWe plants by the year 2000, but these are likely to change because of a decision by Prime Minister Raj iv Gandhi to import two large reactors from the Soviet Union. An agreement on the purchase of two VVER-1000 reactors is likely to be signed this winter during a visit to New Delhi by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. The Rs. 48-billion (U.S.$3.5-billion) deal will be India's largest ever import contract. The decision to import reactors has been severely criticized by many Indian analysts, and there are indications that the proposed deal might actually be a quid pro quo for the Soviet lease of a nuclear-powered fleet submarine to India last January.
India, which operates a small experimental test breeder reactor at Kalpakkam, is designing a 500-MWe prototype fast-breeder reactor which it plans to build and commission by the turn of this century.[54] However, the present target of building a 10,000-MWe capacity and generating 10 percent of the country's total electricity requirements in the year 2000 from nuclear power appears unrealistic by most accounts. India I s nuclear power sector has been plagued by cost overruns, slippages and design and equipment problems. For example, the construction cost of the Narora station has increased more than two-and-half times because of what the government describes as "delays in the supply of critical equipment such as steam generators and the acquisition of land for the exclusion zone."[55] It seems unlikely that both Soviet reactors proposed to be imported will come on stream by the year 2000.

The reactor construction program has accelerated work in fuel technologies. With the exception of the U.S. -built Tarapur station, all Indian plants currently in operation or under construction are heavy-water reactors. Such reactors pose both a proliferation and a terrorism risk if the plutonium they produce is separated from spent fuel. India's high-flux Dhruva research reactor, capable of producing 25 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium annually, is now operating at full capacity.[56] Another plutonium-producing research reactor is CIRUS, which provided the plutonium for India's atomic device detonated in May, 1974.

India's stocks of separated civilian plutonium are projected to rise sharply in the next 10 years as the country expands its already significant reprocessing capacity. According to the head of India's atomic program, M.R. Srinivasan, the country's stockpile of separated plutonium outside the scope of international safeguards is expected to be thousands of kilograms in the next 10 years.[57] No official figures have been released on the amount of plutonium already separated by India, but one study estimates that India could have stockpiled 100 to 200 kilograms of plutonium by mid-1987.[58]

India's nuclear propulsion project, involving scientists from the Defense Research and Development Organization, the Bhabha Atomic Research Center and other institutions, has spawned a uranium enrichment project about which few details are available. Nuclear submarines in the United States, the Soviet Union and Britain are fueled by weapons-grade uranium (93 to 97 percent U235). But the new French Rubis design generates high propulsion power in a small reactor core by using uranium enriched by a factor of less than 10 percent, far below the 20- percent threshold for weapons applications.[59] Indian scientists involved in the SSN project should consider developing propulsion fuel of similar enrichment level to avoid the security risks associated with weapons-grade U-235.

Fuel for the nuclear reactors in operation is fabricated by the Hyderabad-based Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC) , which has a capacity to manufacture 80 tons of PHWR fuel every year. In addition, the NFC also fabricates LEU oxide fuel for Tarapur using enriched uranium hexaf luoride imported f rom. France. NFC I s capacity is now being expanded to 225 tons in order to keep pace with the power construction program. Additional facilities also are under construction to fabricate fuel for the series of reactors scheduled to be built in the 1990s.[60] India has almost 42,500 tons of reasonably assured uranium resources, and recent aerial surveys have "established there are fairly rich deposits of uranium in Andhra Pradesh's Rayalaseema district and also in other places like Madhya Pradesh and Meghalaya."[61]

The size of the current Indian nuclear program and the country's ambitious expansion program, seen in the context of the level of domestic terrorism, make the task of protecting nuclear facilities and weapons-usable materials formidable. The projected sharp increase in the separation and use of civil plutonium in India over the next decade will place heavy physical -security demands on the nuclear establishment and police and intelligence organizations. With India's current emphasis on pursuing plutonium recycle and breeder reactors to eventually replace the current generation of CANDU reactors, large quantities of weapons-usable plutonium will have to be protected at reprocessing and fabrication facilities, storage sites and in transit.

The question of safeguarding any nuclear arms is difficult to address in the absence of firm international evidence of India having some bombs in the basement. India can readily build a small nuclear arsenal, and there are indications that BARC scientists have been working on weapon designs f or some time. But most accounts suggest that India is following a policy of restraint at present.62 Prime Minister Gandhi has indicated the declared policy of restraint will change if Pakistan develops nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, it is not too early to consider the extraordinary and expensive measures that would need to be taken, including highly sophisticated PAL and NEST capabilities, if India is forced to take the unfortunate decision of building a nuclear arsenal. It may be in India's own interest to put of f any decision on a nuclear military program until the mid-1990s by which time its civilian nuclear program is expected to grow to such an extent that it would leave Pakistan far behind in the capability to produce the materials and components for nuclear warheads.[63] By the year 2000, India would also have separated more civilian plutonium than the plutonium China now has in its nuclear arsenal.[64]

Nuclear Development in Pakistan
The death of Pakistan President Mohammed Zia ul-Haq on August 17 has cast a cloud over the future of the country's nuclear program. General Zia had played a key role in rapidly expanding Pakistan's nuclear base in the 11 years that he was in power. The manner in which Islamabad has managed to acquire sensitive nuclear equipment and materials by circumventing nuclear-export controls has shown the ineffectiveness of the current international nonproliferation regime.
It has been well documented that the Kahuta plant was built with the stolen blueprints of the Almelo enrichment facility in the Netherlands. Pakistan also built a facility at Dera Ghazi Khan to manufacture