NUCLEAR TERRORISM Threat, Perception and Response in South Asia

By PAUL LEVENTHAL President Nuclear Control Institute Washington, DC
and
BRAHMA CHELLANEY Research Fellow Center for Science and International Affairs Harvard University

This paper was prepared under the auspices of the Nuclear Control Institute's Nuclear Terrorism Prevention Project for presentation to the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, New Delhi October 10, 1988

I. INTRODUCTION

Risks of nuclear terrorism and blackmail have increased significantly in recent years mainly because of three factors: the growth and spread of nuclear weapons, the expansion of civilian nuclear programs and the increase in extremist political groups waging campaigns of terror. The growing danger encompasses much of the world. Lax or inadequate security over nuclear materials and weapons in one country could be exploited to trigger atomic blackmail and terrorism elsewhere. Inadequate security at nuclear facilities also could provide extremists waging a campaign of terror within a nation an opportunity to create a situation of national terror by seizing or sabotaging a civilian nuclear power plant or a research reactor or a laboratory.

Nuclear power stations, research reactors and laboratories are vulnerable to acts of sabotage and blatant terrorist attacks that could cause the release of dangerous amounts of radioactive materials. Expanding civil commerce in weapons- usable nuclear materials has raised the specter of theft of plutonium or uranium in significant quantities in plots aimed at political blackmail or terror. There is also a danger of theft of nuclear arms by terrorists.

The increasing level of technological sophistication among terrorist groups, coupled with a renewed determination to achieve political goals, has significantly raised the potential for nuclear terrorism. It is imperative that this expanding threat of nuclear blackmail and terror should spur policymakers to focus on corrective measures to ensure stringent security and safety at nuclear installations.[1]

Developments in several parts of the world are prompting scholars and policymakers to reexamine old theories of terrorism. The terrorist slaying of more than 1,800 civilians this year alone in Punjab[2] has belied arguments that, "Simply killing a lot of people has seldom been a terrorist objective. Terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead."[3] Few scholars had earlier believed that terrorists would resort to weapons of mass destruction. Many experts had also discounted the possibility of terrorists seizing a nuclear power plant or research reactor to draw national and international attention to their demands. Their argument was that extremists would not dare engage in such terrorist actions because of the strong public outrage and mass repulsion those actions would trigger in society. However, we know that terrorists' beliefs and actions often seem devoid of any rationality. It is now coming to be seen that the threat of nuclear terrorism and blackmail must be assumed to be real. The probability of such actions occurring in relation to other forms of terrorism may be low. Yet, a single successful act of nuclear terrorism could have such far-reaching consequences within a nation, or even globally, that extraordinary vigilance and precautions against such an act should be exercised wherever nuclear weapons, materials or facilities are found.

Indeed, if risk can be calculated as probability times consequence -- and the low probability of nuclear terrorism is multiplied by the astronomical consequence of a successful act - the risk of nuclear terrorism must be considered to be high, and to be growing in proportion to increases in nuclear weapons, materials and facilities and to the rise of terrorism worldwide. The level of terrorism reached an all-time record level in 1987, and this year acts of international terrorism are expected to be even higher.[4]

In South Asia, the potential for nuclear terrorism should be a matter of special concern for several reasons. one is the rapidly expanding nuclear programs in India and Pakistan involving massive investments in the construction and operation of civilian nuclear power plants, research reactor, laboratories and reprocessing and enrichment facilities. Another reason is the growing stockpiles of nuclear fissionable materials, possibly of actual weapons, in each country; protecting them requires special technologies, safety systems and security checks and surveillance. A third reason is that both neighbors continue to be wracked by high levels of terrorist activities that pose major political challenges to their national leaders. Indeed, one nation or perhaps both lost a leader at the hands of terrorists since 1984. A fourth reason is the growing sophistication of terrorist methods of operation and attack and the increasing availability of portable weapon systems like shoulder-fired rockets that can be used to accurately strike nuclear installations.

The growing international threat of nuclear terrorism prompted the U.S. Congress to enact the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act in 1986.[5] The legislation directs the President to open a number of national and international initiatives aimed at diminishing the dangers of nuclear blackmail and terrorism. The law also requires the executive branch to closely monitor nuclear materials and restrict international shipments of bomb-grade materials of U.S. origin. various government departments are required to periodically report to Congress about physical -security standards for shipment and storage overseas of U.S.-derived nuclear materials. This legislation has helped to evolve a coherent and stringent physical-security safeguards policy for the country.

What specifically should be done in South Asia in response to the dangers of nuclear blackmail and terrorism? That is the question that this paper seeks to answer. The Nuclear Control Institute's International Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism made a number of recommendations of significance and relevance to South Asia. We explore the threat in the region and the relevance of Task-Force recommendations to policymakers and analysts in South Asia. We also examine conventional terrorism in the subcontinent in the context of increased nuclear activities in the region. We provide an overview of recent nuclear developments in South Asia. And we conclude with policy recommendations and specific proposals to check the threat of nuclear blackmail and terrorism.

II. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TASK-FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS

There are a number of ways terrorists in South Asia or elsewhere could strike nuclear terror in society. They include seizing a nuclear plant for blackmail, sabotaging a nuclear reactor and triggering a Chernobyl-type disaster, making or stealing a nuclear device for blackmail or detonation, truck- bombing a nuclear plant, stealing weapons-grade uranium or plutonium or carrying out an ambush-attack on a shipment of nuclear materials. The most likely form of atomic terrorism may involve, without mass killing or destruction, a credible threat or hoax to trigger a nuclear device or to sabotage a reactor or disperse radioactive material for highly coercive results. Such a threat or hoax is likely to cause severe social, psychological and political disruption in society.[6]

Factors fostering the international dangers of nuclear terrorism include apparent evidence of state support, even sponsorship, of terrorist groups. In South Asia, we witness the ominous spectacle of India accusing Pakistan of training and arming Sikh dissidents, and Pakistan charging the Kabul regime with sponsoring terrorism within Pakistan.[7] Three other general factors of special relevance to the subcontinent are: a growing number of possible terrorist targets in the civil nuclear programs; the possibility of procuring nuclear equipment and materials from illicit nuclear markets; and "the growing incidence, sophistication and lethality of conventional forms of terrorism, often to increase shock value.[8]

Pakistan's nuclear program, built on what has been documented as a state-sponsored campaign of nuclear espionage and smuggling, carries some inherent dangers. It is conceivable that some Pakistani official might seek to emulate the exploits of fellow countrymen involved in nuclear smuggling and be tempted to sell nuclear technology to political extremists within their own country or to agents of an Arab country that they perceive as friendly. Diversion of nuclear materials, radioactive wastes and equipment to the international black market by unscrupulous agents poses a major terrorism problem. Norway admitted earlier this year that two shipments of heavy water were diverted to the black market, arousing suspicions that India may have bought the material.[9] In the hands of political extremists or a maverick state, an atomic device or weapons-usable material could become a powerful instrument of nuclear blackmail and terror in a holy "jihad" against enemies.[10]
Protection of Nuclear Weapons

The Task Force's recommendations for consideration by policymakers include multilayered protection of deployed or stored nuclear weapons in order to deter or preclude terrorist actions. In particular, the most advanced protective systems consisting of "permissive action link" (PAL) devices with limited-try and command-disable functions should be integrated into nuclear weapons to leave stolen arms useless. Safeguarding arms is a major task for the nuclear-weapon states because of the large number of weapons in this world, with each superpower maintaining more than 23,000 warheads in its arsenals. The task is particularly formidable in Western Europe because of the size of nuclear programs and a high level of terrorist activity by sophisticated, well-armed groups operating across national borders.[11]

It is not publicly known if India and Pakistan have actually produced any nuclear bombs despite their acknowledged capability to do so. There have been several reports in recent months suggesting that one or both may already have some bombs in the basement,[12] but the evidence to back up those claims has been thin. Neither side is known to have tested nuclear weapons; however, India's 1974 "peaceful nuclear explosion" (PNE) was tantamount to demonstrating a weapon detonation, while Pakistan is reported to have been provided the design of a tested weapon by China. Political and military leaders in both countries could have little confidence in relying on untested weapons.[13] But if either nation has bombs or plans to manuf acture them, it would also have to develop weapon-protection technology to guard against unauthorized use by disgruntled officers or terrorists.

The Task Force has suggested that the command, control and communications systems for deployment and use of nuclear weapons should be such as to deny data access to terrorists for a weapon detonation. The Task Force has also recommended that nations with nuclear weapons deployed within their borders should establish Nuclear Emergency Search Teams (NESTs) modeled after the NEST operated by the U. S. Department of Energy to f ind and render harmless stolen nuclear weapons, improvised nuclear devices or weapons-usable materials.[14]

Protection of Nuclear Materials

The safeguarding of nuclear materials and facilities should be a matter of utmost concern to authorities in India and Pakistan. The Task Force has made five recommendations on protecting nuclear materials.

1. Civil nuclear materials worldwide in forms suitable for use in weapons should be given protection equivalent to government protection of weapons. Both India and Pakistan are currently applying reprocessing and enrichment technologies and producing weapons-usable materials.[15] Pakistan's high-speed gas centrifuges at Kahuta are producing enriched uranium without its evident need by the country's small atomic power program. It is also trying to complete construction of the Chashma and Rawalpindi reprocessing plants. India has a growing stockpile of unsafeguarded, bomb- grade plutonium, with reprocessing facilities operating at Trombay and Tarapur. India's nuclear submarine project has led to research on enrichment technologies, and nuclear authorities have admitted that they have succeeded in enriching uranium "to any level the country needs."[16] The Indian government says the plutonium extracted f rom. the Madras Atomic Power Station (MAPS) spent fuel is f or use in fast-breeder reactors. It is important that nuclear materials, even if dedicated for peaceful purposes, should be provided the same kind of protection as governments possessing nuclear arms provide to their weapons and weapon components and materials.

2. The cost of protecting weapons-usable forms of nuclear materials should be factored into decisions to produce and use them. The high costs of producing weapons-usable materials in peaceful nuclear programs and protecting them should be weighed carefully against any actual benefits in using the materials commercially. The United States, which still has a virtual monopoly of the world market in highly-enriched uranium (HEU), is now encouraging other nations to modify their research reactors to run on low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuels because of growing concerns over the possible theft or diversion of weapons-usable materials. Domestically, the United States has avoided use of HEU and plutonium fuels in the civilian power sector in all but one reactor and is requiring the conversion of licensed research reactors to LEU. Nevertheless, international availability of plutonium and HEU is growing, and there is a consequent increase in global shipments of weapons- usable material that could invite terrorist actions. Development of commercial laser isotope enrichment technologies is expected sooner or later to give countries the ability to quickly -- and secretly -- produce HEU. Production of HEU is now accomplished by gaseous diffusion and centrifuge techniques and so far has been restricted mostly to nuclear- weapon states. The spread of enrichment technologies to other countries is proceeding despite the fact that "the possibility of rationalizing ... production (of HEU) by claiming a civilian use is rapidly losing its legitimacy."[17]

A striking lack of commercial legitimacy applies especially to the clandestine enrichment project in Pakistan. similarly, India's breeder program, which is explained as a long-term energy security plan to overcome the country's limited uranium resources, can absorb only a small fraction of the plutonium available for commercial separation and use. India's civil program in plutonium oxide and mixed oxide fuels will raise problems of safety and security and involve high costs of storage. Yet, stockpiles of separated plutonium far in excess of commercial needs are bound to increase in the next couple of years with the addition of a new facility at Kalpakkam to the nation's formidable 130-ton reprocessing capacity currently.[18]

3. In the meantime, reexamination of civil applications of plutonium can be conducted on economic grounds. Security and other economic costs necessitate a global reappraisal of the rapidly expanding separation and use of civil plutonium. Governments should consider limiting plutonium use to small fast-breeder research and development and demonstration programs but avoid large-scale commercial commitments. India's large thorium reserves provide it a safer but challenging route to breeder development. Global reserves of nonweapons-usable fuels for conventional reactors are large and readily available at low prices to nations embracing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the fullscope international safeguards regime. Since India and Pakistan have refused to sign the NPT or accept fullscope safeguards, they cannot readily avail themselves of low-enriched uranium. But this problem has not proved insuperable: India's one power station using LEU is now being supplied by France, itself a non-NPT state, while supplies of natural-uranium fuel required by all other power reactors in India and Pakistan's sole power station are not encumbered by NPT restrictions.

4. Conversion of reactors from weapons-grade uranium fuels to lower-enriched uranium not usable in weapons should be considered at this time. as well. Almost all HEU-fueled power and research reactors in the world can be converted to LEU fuels without significant reduction in performance. It was the threat from terrorism, as well as proliferation concerns, that prompted the U.S. Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactor Program (RERTR) to develop a high-density, low-enriched fuel not suitable for weapon use. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has ordered most licensed reactors on university campuses and at research institutes to change to LEU fuels. The only research facility in South Asia fueled by HEU is Pakistan's tiny PARR research reactor in Rawalpindi; it has received HEU from the United States under IAEA saf eguards. [19] This only serves to highlight Pakistan's lack of need for its rapidly expanding capability to produce HEU.

5. To the extent civil materials suitable for weapons are used, extraordinary precautions should be taken to protect them from terrorists. Increased use of bomb-grade materials in civilian atomic programs has heightened the dangers of nuclear blackmail and terrorism. The development of plutonium and enrichment technologies in South Asia, and the growing volume of weapons-grade materials at facilities, storage sites or in transit, increase the risk- of theft or diversion by terrorists or criminal bands. The United States abandoned domestic commercial-scale reprocessing and breeder programs due to security, economic and safety considerations. The U.S. Congress pressed ahead with the domestic anti-plutonium policy despite a lack of support from the Reagan Administration.

On the other hand, contrary to the mandate of the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA), the Administration has succeeded in facilitating the development of plutonium-fuel economies in Western Europe and Japan by not opposing extraction of plutonium from U.S. supplied LEU fuel burned in reactors. Earlier this year, Washington signed a controversial agreement with Tokyo providing Japan a 30-year blanket authorization to extract plutonium from spent fuel of American origin.[20] With large quantities of civil plutonium being processed, stored and shipped in commercial activities in Western Europe and Japan, opportunities f or terrorist diversion of the bomb-grade material are increasing every year in the advanced industrial nations.

According to current projections, nearly 400 metric tons of civil plutonium -- twice the quantity of plutonium contained in the combined nuclear arsenals of the superpowers -- will have been separated in the non-Communist world by the turn of this century.[21] Considering that the original implosion-style bomb dropped on Nagasaki contained only six kilograms of plutonium, it is conceivable that terrorists or criminal elements could steal or otherwise acquire a small quantity of plutonium out of the hundreds of tons in nuclear commerce to build a crude atomic device. HEU can be even a more tempting target for terrorists to steal. It is less radioactive and toxic than plutonium and, therefore, less difficult to handle, although more HEU than plutonium is required to fashion a bomb.

An expert group of former weapon designers at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, in a paper presented to the Task Force, say the design and construction of a crude device is within the reach of a terrorist group with the resources to recruit a technical team of three or four specialists with a range of knowledge and skills but no previous nuclear-weapon experience.[22] Policymakers in South Asia would serve their national-energy as well as national -security interests by providing in-depth protection to weapons-usable forms of plutonium and uranium, if not avoiding their production and use altogether. Shipments of such materials by land should take place with armed guards in armored vehicles especially designed to make penetration or removal all but impossible. Shipments by sea should utilize naval escorts and involve constant surveillance and constant communications with quick-response f orces. Air shipments of highly toxic plutonium should be avoided altogether unless plutonium-shipment casks can be developed that are demonstrated to withstand a worst-case crash test of a cargo plane.

Protection of Nuclear Installations

The safeguarding of nuclear installations is an important part of counterterrorism plans. Nuclear plants and research reactors in several parts of the world have little protection against a truckbomb threat. The vehicular bombing of the U.S. embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983 and the series of similar suicide bomb attacks that followed were an eye-opener of what terrorists could do to nuclear facilities. Such attacks on nuclear facilities could conceivably be carried out with catastrophic consequences by terrorists locked in a desperate, sinking position who have nothing to lose and who do not f ear death because their communities or sects would honor them as martyrs. This threat is particularly real in South Asia because of the strong sectarian or ethnic f ervor behind several extremist or separatist campaigns. Power reactors with containment systems are relatively more resistant to truck bombs than research reactors, although such attacks can wreck the control room and essential secondary systems and trigger a core meltdown and catastrophic radioactive releases.
The Task Force has recommended nine approaches to improving protection of nuclear facilities: