Pakistan's compulsion for a war with India: The Kargil Conflict

Nasreen Chowdhory, Doctoral Candidate, University of McGill, Montreal

… the clock shall go on ticking, louder and louder, because it now has nuclear energy infused into it. Aijaz Ahmad 1

Introduction

In the summer of 1999 India fought-off the Pakistani intrusion in Kargil. It was, however, not the first intrusion that India had faced since the 1965 intrusion. It had become a customary practice to exchange fire across the Line of Control (LoC) between Indian and Pakistani armed forces, ever since the two countries gained Independence from British rule. Most explanations for the behaviour of India and Pakistan towards each other centre on their claim and counter-claims over Kashmir.

For India, Kashmir is an integral part of the Union, but for Pakistan without Kashmir the legitimacy of its two-nation theory is insignificant. Given the past disposition of the archrivals it leaves little to the imagination that the compulsive behaviour on the part of Pakistan to continue to de-sanctify the LoC is, therefore, a part of its strategic and domestic compulsion. However the overt declaration by India and Pakistan as nuclear states caught the international community by surprise. The Kargil conflict has recently been declared as 'a short and sharp war' 2 by the Kargil Committee Report. It was also the first war during which India allowed a nearly on the spot reporting of the war. The Kargil conflict needs to be understood and analysed in the light of the newly acquired new nuclear weapon states (NWS) of both India and Pakistan. Besides, its calculation involved specifically for Pakistan, given the long drawn history of its attempts to wrest Kashmir that have been subsequently foiled.

This paper pre-supposes that Pakistan's claims over Kashmir and 'nuclear deterrence theories' are, otherwise, well known. It therefore, proceeds to deal with the nuclear factor as an intervening variable in the Kargil conflict, and then, the calculations involved on both sides, and the domestic politics or predisposition of both India and Pakistan. The nuclear behaviour of India and Pakistan presents several puzzles. In May 1998, India announced to the world that it had detonated five nuclear devices, including a hydrogen bomb 4. Pakistan followed suit and conducted six tests in the Chagai Hills. Operation Brasstacks 1987 The first crisis of South Asia's nuclear concern erupted in December 1986 / January 1987, although prior to this crisis President Zia-ul-Haq, and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi had already signed a nuclear non-attack agreement in December 1985. Interestingly, Operation Brasstacks was India's military exercise that involved two armoured divisions, one mechanised division and six infantry divisions. Brasstacks was probably the largest-ever-military exercise comparable in scale to similar North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 4 exercises outside the NATO. The stated objective of Brasstacks was to test new concepts of mechanization, mobility, and air support devised by the then Indian Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), General K. Sundarji.

Therefore, it would not be wrong to say that Brasstacks was intended to simulate an Indian response to a Pakistani ground offensive, testing the strategy of "offensive-defense." The nature of the exercises generated concern in the Pakistani army, which led to a situation where in both Indian and Pakistani military forces were put on full alert. A situation of such nature had not occurred since the 1971 India-Pakistan War. Despite India's reassurance Pakistan later conducted its own army exercises, Zarb-e-Momin (Sword of the Faithful) and stepped up surveillance of border areas and also placed several of its cantonments on high alert. So it was a tense situation where both the countries were locked in a worse kind of military stand-off where the hotlines of the Directors General of Military Operations (DGMOs) remained disused, and the two countries were on the brink of a war. Soon, the matter was resolved through diplomatic efforts by both countries.

However, around this time, the father of Pakistan's nuclear programme, A.Q. Khan, in an interview to Indian journalist Kuldip Nayar, stated Pakistan could produce a bomb and warned, "nobody can undo Pakistan or take us for granted. We are here to stay and let it be clear that we shall use the bomb of our existence is threatened." 5 This interview was the first authoritative indication that Pakistan possessed nuclear capability. The 1990 Crisis Given the scenario that existed for India and Pakistan, both came close to nuclear confrontation in 1990. Despite a civilian government being in power in Pakistan, the military continued to retain control over its nuclear programme, including the use of nuclear diplomacy. Under Zia, Pakistan had adopted a strategy of undermining Indian security through a war by proxy in Jammu and Kashmir.6 By 1990, the Kashmir insurgency was at its peak as perceived by Pakistan, and India-Pakistan relations had deteriorated. On March 13, Benazir Bhutto travelled to Pakistan controlled Kashmir and promised a "thousand-year war" to support the militants. 7 It was under these circumstances that Pakistan implicitly threatened to use nuclear weapons if India intervened militarily, across the Line of Control (LoC) and, therefore, persuaded the United States to act as an intermediary.8 The chronic conventional arms firing across the LoC in Kashmir increased manifold.

India moved more troops into the region to prevent cross-border infiltration from Pakistan and to threaten hot pursuit or raids on training camps but not to launch concerted, major operations against Pakistan 9. In retrospect it was unlikely that Pakistan would have used nukes, but the success of the nuclear bluff reinforced leadership's belief in the value of nuclear weapons both as a deterrent and as a tool of diplomatic bargaining 10. It was this believe that nuclear weapons can be best used as deterrent that propelled India and Pakistan to go ahead and detonate their bomb respectively, in summer 1999. Therefore any security dilemma that India faced was strengthened by threats from both China, a recognised nuclear weapons power, and Pakistan. In 1992, Pakistan's Foreign Secretary, Shahrayar Khan declared in an interview with Washington Post that Pakistan possessed "all the elements which, if hooked together, would become a (nuclear) device" 11.

It was therefore this false confidence that led Pakistan to commit the ultimate hara-kiri in Kargil. The so-called fourth war with India in the summer of 1999, therefore has to be understood in this light and analyzed in this context, a changed nuclear scene in South Asia with both India and Pakistan having the ability to weaponize at any point of time. Moreover the attitude of the West convinced India that the latter had to deal with its won security concerns. Despite very efforts NPT was extended for 25 years India protested vehemently, but it failed evoke any reaction. Kargil Conflict The Kargil conflict was a shift in Pakistan's strategy from low intensity conflict operation (LICO), which was dependent on the infiltration of mercenaries into Indian territory, to mounting an attack by infiltration undertaken by professional military personnel masquerading as mujahideen.

There are many strands of similarities between the Kargil intrusion/ conflict and the 1965 Pakistani (mis) adventure. In both cases, Pakistan had adopted unconventional methods of warfare in the initial stages of intrusions that later percolated into a war/ war like situation. While analyzing the Kargil conflict we have to bear in mind that a situation similar to Kargil had obtained earlier, and both India and Pakistan did have a number of close calls, both in Operation Brasstacks and the 1990 crisis as stated above but neither led to war. So, what is so different about this "fourth war?" Some basic questions keep coming back. Why did the conflict occur at an (in)opportune time soon after both India and Pakistan detonated the bomb, and what was for Pakistan's calculation, given the newly acquired nuclear status of both countries? Could it have foreseen the end-result of the Kargil war? The Kargil conflict is linked with the nuclearization of South Asia, and its aftermath. Intrusion of such nature was not new along LoC. But Kargil was a conflict that occurred after India detonated a hydrogen bomb, in Pokhran in May 1998, and Pakistan, also in May 1998, in Chagai. The implication of the nuclearization of the region was not lost on the international community. The Indian explosion caught the West unawares, especially the United States. Pakistan detonated six nuclear device in retaliation to India's five.

Pakistan had always desired to be a match for India--nuclear weapons appeared as the means, at least symbolically 12. It was this concept of parity with India that made Pakistan commit the folly in Kargil. Since Kargil is linked with the nuclear issue, lets us begin with why was the bomb, necessary for both India and Pakistan in May 1998 and why not before? Reasons accounting for India's detonation are: the security dilemma faced due to China, one , and Pakistan on the other, with active assistance from China and the United States, till Bush, in 1990 refused Presidential clarification stating that Pakistan did not possess the capability to assemble a bomb. This did create a uproar in Congress, but it could not have been totally a surprise for the U.S. India had the opportunity to weaponize soon after the PNE but decided against the same due to international pressure and fear of 'punishment'.

The one-sided policy of the US of turning a blind eye towards Pakistan's nuclear project continued as long as the Cold War was on. After its end, Pakistan lost it true value for the U.S. and India was never satisfied with the insensitivity of the West towards her security concern, and yet never provided with a nuclear guarantee. Perkovich argued that the bomb was endearing for India primarily because of certain factors, "in addition to the commonly agreed variable of military insecurity 13," the desire to achieve the major power status, the push by the strategic enclave. Credence has been given to the right-wing BJP and her allies for being able to push forward with the detonation. Giving full credit to BJP, would be slighting earlier regime that had continued with India's nuclear program since the PNE, with the exception of Moraji Desai's. The bomb in South Asia has reaffirmed the policies of both India and Pakistan who had a long drawn policy since 1973 in Pakistan, and India after 1953.

It was a ramification of a programme that probably became more overt rather than continuing as opaque proliferants. Mearsheimer's, argument counters Perkovich's point that India detonated because of national pride, instead like the U.S, it (India) too, had sound strategic reasoning for wanting nuclear arsenals. Nuclear weapons are an excellent deterrent against aggression and India lives in a dangerous neighborhood 14. It was therefore more a case of security, vis-à-vis China, and doing the right thing after a long period of time 15. In other words, the BJP could not have prepared for nuclear testing right from scratch, barely seven weeks after gaining power 16. In the case of Pakistan, the detonation by was a conclusive act that it would follow suit soon, with or with out the blessings of the United States.

Therefore the calculation for Pakistan was more in tune with the experiences of 1965, when the military was reluctant to use air force with its full might in the initial stages of the war. In Kargil the strategic location of the intruders (Pakistani army regulars) disguised as Muhahideen sitting atop the hill that made Indian army an easy prey as they often walked right into enemy ambush 17. The main plank of the Indian strategy in 1965 was to wean Pakistani forces away from Kashmir towards Punjab and there were no long range plans for capturing or occupying other areas of Pakistan 18. Kargil was rather difficult as the Pakistanis were 300 feet within the LoC (Indian side) and were occupying strategic hill-tops within 1000km of Indian territory, thereby making the use of air-force difficult 19. It became gradually known that Pakistani troops and irregulars held the entire area spanning Kargil sector from Mushkosh Valley in the west to Chorbat La in the east 20.

The then Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshall A. Y. Tipnis, stated, at a press conference, "the consequences of the restricted use of air power had been made clear to the Government 21." This meant attacks on major Pakistan supply bases and artillery positions were ruled out because such an offensive would have meant flying across the LoC. Given the role of the international community at this point of time, India was asked to restrain from crossing over the LoC. Therefore air bombardment started much later, after the casualties had risen to a considerable number. It was after the first major Indian victory, i.e., the capture of the Tololing heights facing Drass, that air power was used. So it was the combined task of sustained air force and ground bombardment that Indian troops were able to regain some of the captured territory.

Among the most spectacular victories were those of the Garhwal Rifles, the Bihar Regiment, the Gurkha Rifles, and the Grenadiers who pushed their way through the Batalik heights and recaptured Indian territory. However it was the withdrawal of Pakistani troops from Mushkoh valley and Kaksar that the Indian army begun their process of regaining ground. Given the Indian gain it was difficult to discern how gainful they were in actual reality. The terrain was hilly and it became evident to both the GoI and the army that indeed it promised to be a prolonged conflict in order to flush out the intruders once for all.

At this GoI made a final appeal to the US that a full-scale assault across the LoC was nearly imminent. India had already lost 100 troops and US realized that India would mount an attack across LoC in a final attempt to dislodge the Pakistanis. This would "open a second front elsewhere on its borders with Pakistan, widening the first armed conflict between the rivals since both tested nuclear weapons last year 22." The Prime Minister of Pakistan was invited by the US President to Washington on June 29, and later the War came to a close a Pakistani troops were given a time-frame to withdraw. This was therefore more of a diplomatic victory rather than military, for had the US not 'put in a good word' it would have been another bloody war.

(Mis)calculations for Pakistan

In terms of calculation, the Pakistan leadership in comparison to the 1965 war was not contemplating a 'short limited war to be waged in the Kashmir area 23.' Kargil was aimed to be prolonged, given the strategic heights that Pakistani occupied, which was a distinct disadvantage to India. Besides, no air power could be used without crossing the LoC.

Pakistani troops were at an advantage from the very beginning. The war was aimed at achieving territorial and political objectives in Kashmir. But it was obvious that despite the advantage Pakistan enjoyed it could not hold on for long. So what did Pakistan achieve? In India-Pakistan relations asymmetry is an inherent feature that fuels insecurity and results in tension along the border, given Pakistan's predisposition towards Kashmir. In such a situation a smaller state is likely to make attempts to correct the imbalance of power through the force of arms at an (in)appropriate time. Pakistan's intrusion in Kargil could therefore be perceived as an act of desperation since the insurgency in Kashmir may not have been progressing according to plans.

Therefore, at a macro-level, Kargil could be attributed to three basic objectives, military, political, and diplomatic. For it is beyond doubt that Kashmir issue shot to limelight more after the conflict. However, Islamabad's Kashmir-centric national security and foreign policy makes the Kashmir issue a common theme for these objectives. For the Pakistanis the compelling reason was to cut off the logistics route- the National Highway 1, Alpha to the Siachen Glacier-in order to eventually capture the Kashmir from India. The other, was to alter the status of the LoC and provide a stimulus to the weakening insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir. At a domestic level, Kargil served as a means to distract public opinion from bad governance. Moreover the conflict erupted at a moment when the Lahore Bus Diplomacy was initiated to normalise India-Pakistan relations.

The decision to intrude across LoC was made under the leadership of a civilian prime minister, Nawaz Sharif. And he lost control over the affairs of the country. The Pakistani army was very displeased when Pakistan troops had to withdraw and they accused the prime minister of 'selling out the Kashmir issue'. As for India's achievement, the spoils of the so-called victory as claimed by Defence Minister George Fernandes brought the BJP and her allies back to Parliament, along with the bomb issue 24. Therefore domestic issue was a criteria for both India and Pakistan. In the case of India it was the aftermath of the 'fourth war' and the detonation of the bomb that led BJP back to power, and for Pakistan, the idea of Sharif 'selling out' the cause of Kashmir led to his exit.

Conclusion

The most logical conclusion would be that Kargil was something that none of the Western powers were prepared for, i.e., it was too soon after the nuclearization of South Asia. Pakistan for long was depending on the West to bail it out of the situation but not after it has achieved its goal. The real reason behind the 'fourth war' can only be speculated with adequate conjectures. For a moment, it could be presumed that Pakistan as a nuclear weapon state locked in a conventional conflict with India wanted the conflict to assume a nuclear flashpoint and thus serve to internationalize the Kashmir issue.

The latter part sounds more plausible, because Pakistan has been making efforts in trying to bring in the US in the Indo-Pak conflict over Kashmir. If one were to accept this argument then why did both the crises prior to the Kargil conflict, i.e., Brasstacks and the 1990 crisis, not percolate down to a war-like situation, like the fourth war did. What is the connection between the fourth war and the nuclear issue. It would be wrong to believe that there was no connection between the two, but that was not the only cause for Pakistan to go to war. At no point during the Kargil conflict did Pakistan or India entertain the fear of using nuclear weapons as feared by the other five nuclear weapon states.

Soon after Pokhran II the Indian prime minister professed no first use, which Pakistan failed to reciprocate. This could have caused a certain degree of misgiving to Western powers, thereby visualizing a nuclear catastrophe in South Asia. If we take a step backward and go back to Brasstacks and the 1990 crisis and question why India and Pakistan did not go to war? The answer is, the presence of nuclear weapons at that point of time cast an existential deterrent shadow over India-Pakistan relations, and both were dissuaded to fight given the knowledge of their nuclear capabilities.

Another could be the simple fact that either country's nuclear first-strike capability could redound to its disadvantage, given the short distances separating Indian and Pakistani targets, and consequent chances of a nuclear fallout. Hagerty has argued that Brasstacks was instrumental in hastening the nuclear programme of both the countries. Going by that logic then, after both the countries had detonated their bombs respectively, they were not to go for a head-along conflict and threaten the use of nuclear arsenals. As Perkovich points, India and Pakistan had signed an agreement preventing conventional weapon attacks on civilian nuclear facilities, and in 1985 recognized that both would not attack each other's nuclear facilities.

In other words, every possible precaution was taken to prevent any possibility of the use of nuclear weapons. So nuclear issue was not a primary concern for India and Pakistan during the Kargil conflict. Perhaps the (mis)perception of the new confidence of nuclear weapons made the Pakistani army sure of its leverage over India, and created a belief that a 'suitable and befitting' response from the international community would come on the Kashmir issue. But then another puzzle remains unresolved, why did India detonate the bomb, thirty-six years after the 1962 War with China, which soon thereafter acquired nuclear capability. One reason could be the testing of the Ghauri missile by Pakistan. The medium-range missile has a range of 1,500km with a payload of 700 kilograms. This was a shock for India, as the Ghauri brought most Indian cities under its range. It was a signal indicating that Pakistan would not be cowed down. Nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles are great equalizers, and Pakistan's main aim was to achieve parity with India at any cost.

India's concern was registered with the US, and it was found that the Americans were rather insensitive. According to an Indian official privy to the talks, Ambassador Richardson lamented the Ghauri test and the prospect of further missile competition between India and Pakistan but reiterated that the United States had a special relationship with Pakistan, too, and could not simply take India's 'side ' on this issue 25. Moreover, Richardson met Nawaz Sharif in Islamabad and said that Clinton's administration considered Pakistan 'a strategic friend and an ally.' This was an indication that India needed to have its own security umbrella given its own security dilemma vis-à-vis China on one hand and Pakistan that enjoyed US favouritism, on the other. Though India has a long-standing rivalry with Pakistan, the China factor in Indo-Pak relation had reached its pinnacle, especially now, after the Kargil conflict.

Therefore it was both systemic and sub-systemic consideration that propelled India to detonate the bomb. Moreover, the Chinese policy of simultaneous engagement and containment made it more an indirect threat than a direct one. The Kargil conflict was a warning to both India and Pakistan that a situation of a similar nature may arise at any point of time, especially after the turnover of events in Pakistan. The military regime at the helm of affairs in Pakistan may not bode well for the future of India-Pakistan relations. It is also a warning to the western powers that the region may be a boiling-pot, especially if the United States was to continue its earlier policies of favouritism and one-sidedness, without giving in to the legitimate security concerns of India. However, it is difficult to account for the change in US attitudes, between Pokhran II and post-Ghauri testing.

Post-Ghauri testing, India had expressed her concern but it was not suitably addressed. It is a wonder that after the 1998 detonation the US, along with other nuclear states, became rather concerned about the future of the region. After the detonations, the U.S. tried to persuade India and Pakistan to cap their respective nuclear programmes and not weaponize, but so far it has failed to evoke any positive reaction and concrete results. It therefore remains to be seen if India and Pakistan would weaponize their nuclear programs, despite the efforts of the Western powers, i.e. the NWS to prevent them from doing the same.

Endnotes

1. Aijaz Ahmad, "Mediation by any other name", Frontline, July 30, 1999.
2. According to The Kargil Committee Report, May 1999 intrusion by Pakistani army regulars has been given a new dimension and has been declared as an act of aggression leaning towards war. In other words it is not a regular case of intrusion adopted by Pakistan as part of their strategy to continue the proxy war in order to under the Indian control of Kashmir.
3. T. V. Paul, "The Systemic Bases of India's Challenges to the Global Nuclear Order", The Nonproliferation Review, Fall 1998, p. 1.
4. Devin. T. Hagerty, The Consequences of Proliferation Lessons from South Asia, London: The MIT Press, 1998 p. 96.
5. New York Times, March 2, 1987.
6. Ahmed, p. 189.
7. Devin T. Hagerty, "Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia," International Security v. 20 n. 3, Winter 1995/96, p. 100.
8. Zahid Hussain, "Deliberate Nuclear Ambiguity," Samina Ahmed and David Cortright, Pakistan and the Bomb, Notre Dame: Notre dame University Press, p. 39.
9. Hagerty, "Nuclear Deterrence", p. 98.
10. Pervaz Hoodbhoy, "Pakistan Nuclear Future," in Ahmed and Cortright, Pakistan and the Bomb, p.71.
11. Quoted in Samina Ahmed and David Cortright, "Pakistani Public Opinion and Nuclear Weapons Policy," in Ahmed and Cortright, Pakistan and the Bomb, p. 4.
12. Gerorge Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb The Impact on Global Proliferation, London: University of California, 1999, p. 435.
13. Ibid., p.452.
14. John. J. Mearsheimer, "India Needs the Bomb," The New York Times, March 24, 2000.
15. Under Prime Ministership of N.S. Rao, in November 1995, India came to the verge of testing, but it was called off because of pressure from U.S. In fact his successor, both Deve Gowda, and I.K. Gujral always maintained this state of readiness to detonate.
16. T.V. Paul, The Nonproliferation Review, p. 7.
17. This could account for the rise in Kargil casualties.
18. T.V. Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers, Cambridge University Press: Melbourne, 1994, p. 109.
19. Pravin, Swami, The Kargil War, Leftword Books: New Delhi, 1999, p. 56.
20. Pravin Swami, "Preliminary Exploration on the Kargil War," Faultlines, New Delhi, vol. II, July 1999, p. 2.
21. Ibid., p.3.
22. The US Angle, reproduced from The Washington Post, in Frontline, July 16, 1999, p. 11.
23. T.V. Paul, p.111.
24. Jasjit Singh, "The Fourth War" www.idsa-india.org and Swami, Faultlines, p. 17.
25. Perkovich, p. 412.