How do we get to where we want to be?—National commitment and a multi-year plan
What do we need to do in order to achieve the capabilities of a modern and flexible nuclear weapons design and production enterprise? In short, we need to revitalize and sustain our production capabilities, our R&D and technology base, and our world-class workforce. Critical to this is a national commitment to safe and reliable nuclear forces, which the NPR has reaffirmed, and implementation of a stable, multi-year fiscal plan. Such a plan would provide the long-term commitment and stability to restore or modernize critical infrastructure and capabilities so that we can meet future workload requirements under a more rigorous regulatory regime. It would also allow us to redress the deferred maintenance backlogs, assure world-class science and engineering capabilities and workforce, and carry out the initiatives of the NPR. Let me elaborate further.
Modernize nuclear weapons production capabilities
The production complex, which has seen site closures and considerable downsizing since the end of the Cold War, consists of the following “one of a kind” facilities: the Y-12 Plant (uranium and other components), Pantex Plant (warhead assembly, disassembly, disposal, high explosive components), Kansas City Plant (non-nuclear components), and Savannah River Plant (tritium extraction and handling). In addition, production activities for specific components occur at two national labs: Sandia National Laboratories (neutron generators), and Los Alamos National Laboratory (plutonium/beryllium parts, detonators, tritium targets for neutron generators).
The current production complex is limited in the number of weapons that can be processed at the Pantex Plant, with the work split among units undergoing surveillance, refurbishment or dismantlement. Planned renovations of existing facilities will expand capacity sufficient to meet the anticipated NPR workload and include a small reserve that would be available to fix unanticipated problems in the stockpile, respond to new warhead production requirements, or handle a potentially increased dismantlement workload (resulting from force reductions) without disrupting planned refurbishments.
Qualified processes for some uranium manufacturing and processing are not currently in place, but plans are underway to expand the capacity and capability of the Y-12 Plant to meet the planned workload for replacing warhead secondaries and other uranium components.
Regardless of the size of the future nuclear weapons stockpile, substantial work must be completed to get the production complex to the point where it is “ready” to begin refurbishment work on key systems later this decade. Additionally, new construction projects, including that for a modern pit production facility discussed below, are needed to ensure sufficient capacity for planned future-decade stockpile refurbishments.
Modernize the R&D and technology base
Stockpile stewardship requires strong R&D capabilities to predict, discover, and evaluate problems in the current stockpile (especially those associated with component aging or defects), to design, develop and certify new warheads in the absence of testing, and to attract and retain a world-class technical staff. Thus, in addition to modernizing production capabilities, efforts are underway to restore and improve the technical base of the nuclear weapons enterprise and to develop advanced capabilities to meet future requirements. Key needs include:
Secure and sustain a world-class work force
Recruitment and retention of an expert workforce is a major challenge. The aging of the technical staff at the national laboratories, the production plants and the NTS is a concern highlighted by a variety of review groups, including the Congressionally-appointed Commission on Nuclear Weapons Expertise (Chiles Commission) and the Foster Panel. In its 1999 report, the Chiles Commission observed that the average age of those supplying critical skills to the weapons program is 48 years—a population considerably older than that for the average U.S. high-tech industry. A major factor in this demography was the low hiring rates in the early-tomid-1990’s as budgets for the weapons program were in decline. Recruiting rates have gone up modestly, but are still much lower than required to support planned programs. More recently, morale problems at the laboratories in the wake of security problems have raised concerns for retention, and recruiting has been more difficult than in the past because of competition from the private sector of the U.S. job market, limited knowledge about the program among the general population, and adverse publicity, among other factors.
But the tide is turning. Morale is improving. Both the laboratories and the plants are working closely with the Federal staff to attract and retain the future workforce. Maintaining a strong science component of the stockpile stewardship program, coupled with real opportunities for working on advanced warhead concepts, developing a strong intern program to integrate new scientists and engineers into the weapons program, improving ties with universities, fixing the deteriorating manufacturing infrastructure, and developing new R&D facilities such as NIF, DARHT and MESA where the most advanced research in the world is taking place, are all examples of these efforts. The loss of knowledge resulting from retirement and attrition, and the need to transfer critical knowledge heighten the urgency of this effort.
Implications of the NPR for key NNSA missions
Next, I describe how specific NNSA missions will be affected by the NPR, and address the “game plan” for implementation of the NPR initiatives.
Stockpile Levels and Readiness Requirements
The NPR stated a goal to reduce the operationally-deployed strategic stockpile to 3800 nuclear warheads by 2007 and 1700-2200 nuclear warheads by 2012. The force would be based on 14 Trident SSBNs (with 2 SSBNs in overhaul at any time), 500 Minuteman III ICBMs, 76 B-52H bombers, and 21 B-2 bombers. There would also be a non-strategic stockpile whose exact quantities and readiness requirements are still to be determined.
Although the NPR did not determine specific stockpile quantities or readiness requirements, it did introduce to the stockpile lexicon the categories operationally-deployed and responsive. Operationally-deployed warheads are warheads fully ready for use and either mated on, or allocated to, operational delivery systems; these warheads are part of the active stockpile.3 Responsive warheads are warheads available to be uploaded to delivery systems in the event that world events require a more robust deterrence posture; most or all of these warheads would also be part of the active stockpile.
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3 Active weapons are fully maintained with all Limited Life Components (LLCs, e.g., tritium bottles) installed. Inactive weapons have the LLCs removed upon expiration.
Remaining warheads not slated for retirement or dismantlement would be retained in the inactive stockpile, available for use in stockpile evaluation support or as one-for-one reliability replacements for warheads in the operationally deployed or responsive forces. Several factors would determine the nature, size and scope of warheads in this “other” category including: (1) progress in reestablishing lost production capabilities and infrastructure, (2) response times to fix problems in the stockpile, carry out other required refurbishments to sustain the stockpile, and develop and produce new or modified warheads, and (3) desire to retain a sub-population of nonrefurbished warheads to hedge potential common mode failures. Some warheads in this category would, based on future decisions, be retired and eliminated. NNSA and DoD will work together to clarify the NPR “drawdown” in terms of the numbers and types of warheads, by year, to be maintained in the active and inactive stockpiles at various states of readiness.
Stockpile surveillance
In the past, if a stockpile problem occurred, there was the flexibility, with larger warhead numbers, to maintain deterrence requirements by reallocating warheads to targets. With the force reductions planned under the NPR, these options diminish. As a result, as we go to lower numbers, we need increased levels of confidence in the safety and reliability of remaining deployed forces. This drives the need for an increasingly robust surveillance program to not only strengthen our ability to detect existing stockpile problems but also to predict and respond to stockpile problems (including problems associated with aging) before