(d) Comprehensive planning and training
for operations in line with the strategy, and
(e) The will to employ nuclear forces
and weapons.
2.7 Highly effective conventional
military capabilities shall be maintained to raise the
threshold of outbreak both of conventional military conflict
as well as that of threat or use of nuclear weapons.
3.
Nuclear Forces
3.1 India's nuclear forces will
be effective, enduring, diverse, flexible and responsive
to the requirements in accordance with the concept of
credible minimum deterrence. These forces will be based
on a triad of aircraft, mobile land-based assets in keeping
with the outlined above. Survivability of the forces will
be enhanced by a combination of multiple redundant systems,
mobility, dispersion and deception.
3.2 The doctrine envisages assured
capability to shift from peacetime deployment to fully
employable forces in the shortest possible time, and the
ability to retaliate effectively even in the case of significant
degradation by hostile strikes.
4.
Credibility and Survivability
The following principles are central
to India's deterrent:
4.1 Credibility- Any adversary must
know that India can and will retaliate with sufficient
nuclear weapons to inflict destruction and punishment
that the aggressor will find unacceptable if nuclear weapons
are used against India and its forces.
4.2 Effectiveness- The efficacy
of India's nuclear deterrent be maximised through synergy
among all elements involving reliability, timeliness,
accuracy and weight of attack
4.3 Survivability:
(i) India's nuclear forces and their
command and control shall be organised for very high survivability
against surprise attacks and for rapid punitive response.
They shall be designed and deployed to ensure survival
against first strike and to endure repetitive attrition
attempts with adequate retaliatory capabilities for a
punishing strike which would be unacceptable to the aggressor.
(ii) Procedures for the continuity
of nuclear command and control shall ensure a continuing
capability to effectively employ nuclear weapons.
5.
Command and Control
5.1 Nuclear weapons shall be tightly
controlled and released for use at the highest political
level. The authority to release nuclear weapons for use
resides in the person of the Prime Minister of India,
or the designated successor(s).
5.2 An effective and survivable
command and control system with requisite flexibility
and responsiveness shall be in place. An integrated operational
plan, or a series of sequential plans, predicated on strategic
objectives and a targeting policy shall form part of the
system.
5.3 For effective employment, the
unity of command and control of nuclear forces including
dual capable delivery systems shall be ensured.
5.4 The survivability of the nuclear
arsenal and effective command, control, communications,
computing, intelligence and information (C412) system
shall be assured.
5.5 The Indian defence forces shall
be in a position to, execute operations in an NBC environment
with minimal degradation.
5.6 Space based and other assets
shall be created to provide early warning, Communications,
damage/detonation assessment.
6.
Security and Safety
6.1 Security: Extraordinary precautions
shall be taken to ensure that nuclear weapons, their manufacture,
transportation and storage are fully guarded against possible
theft, loss, sabotage, damage or unauthorised access or
use.
6.2 Safety is an absolute requirement
and tamper proof procedures and systems shall be instituted
to ensure that unauthorised or inadvertent activation/use
of nuclear weapons does not take place and risk of accident
are avoided.
6.3 Disaster Control: India shall
develop an appropriate disaster control system capable
of handling the unique requirements of potential incidents
involving nuclear weapons and materials;
7.
Research and development
7.1 India should step up efforts
in research and development to keep up with the technological
advances in this field.
7.2 While India is committed to
maintain the deployment of a deterrent which is both minimum
and credible, it will not accept any restrains on building
its R&D capabilities.
8.
Disarmament and Arms Control
8.1 Global, verifiable and non-discriminatory
nuclear disarmament is a national security objective.
India shall continue its effort to achieve the global
of a nuclear weapon-free world at an early date.
8.2 Since no-first use of nuclear
weapons in India's basic commitment, every effort shall
be made to persuade other States possessing nuclear weapons
to join an international treaty banning first use.
8.3 Having provided unqualified
negative security assurances, India shall work for internationally
binding unconditional negative security assurances by
nuclear weapon states to non-nuclear weapon states.
8.4 Nuclear arms control measure
shall be sought as part of national security policy to
reduce potential threats and to protect our own capabilities
and its effectiveness.
8.5 In view of the very high destructive
potential of nuclear weapons, appropriate nuclear risk
reduction and confidence building measures shall be sought,
negotiated and instituted.
Report to the US Congress on Ballistic
Missile Status of India
National Security
Council August 2000
We believe India maintains a nuclear
weapons development effort to go along with its active,
program to develop delivery systems for those weapons.
India's program began in earnest following the 1962 Sino-Indian
War, primarily in response to China's possession of nuclear
weaponry, but also to enhance its international political
and technical prestige. This effort culminated in the
1974 "peaceful nuclear explosion" at the Thar
Desert Test Site. More recently, India's nuclear weapons
program has taken on the additional role of countering
Pakistan's nuclear capability. While there is little information
on India's nuclear strategy and doctrine, it probably
views its nuclear weapons capability as a deterrent against
nuclear attack by its neighbors, to be used in response
to a first strike.
Nuclear Weapons Program
(2.5 lines omitted) Moreover, it
has probably manufactured sufficient parts to assemble
within days a handful of those weapons for delivery by
aircraft.
India has a well developed infrastructure
supporting its nuclear weapons program. The leading institution
for nuclear research and development is the Bhabha Atomic
Research Center (BARC). Several projects at BARC are directly
related to the production of fissile material which could
be utilized for military purposes. These facilities include
the CIRUS and Dhruva research reactors, a spent-fuel reprocessing
plant, and experimental facilities for fabricating and
machining plutonium. BARC also has a uranium metal plant
and a fuel element fabrication plant. In addition to BARC,
India has been attempting to develop gas-centrifuge technology
to enrich uranium at a facility near Mysore. That facility
has begun limited operations, but is beset by technical
difficulties.
Several other unsafeguarded nuclear
facilities -- heavy Water moderated, natural-uranium-fueled
reactors at civilian nuclear power plants near Madras,
Narora and Kakrapar -- could provide a source of plutonium
for India's nuclear weapons program, but this is unlikely
for political, technical, and economic reasons. If it
chose to do so, India would have to greatly expand the
production capabilities of fuel fabrication facilities
and uranium ore concentration plants, improve the reliability
of fuel reloading machines and overcome its inadequate
fuel reprocessing capability for spent fuel from civilian
power plants.
India maintained other facilities
related to its nuclear research and development program.
The Chandigarh Terminal Ballistic Research Laboratory
has the most comprehensive high- explosives test instrumentation
in India and probably participated in experimentation
necessary for the 1974 nuclear test. India also continues
to maintain the Thar Desert nuclear test site in a state
of readiness which would allow the conduct of a test within
a few months if necessary.
The future direction of India's
nuclear program remains unclear. With current capabilities,
India can produce sufficient nuclear material for a handful
of new weapons every year. If it decided to do so, India
could increase the amount of available weapons-grade plutonium
through devoting more resources to the Dhruva research
reactor and by not using stockpiled plutonium for its
breeder reactor program. Successful production of HEU
capability with gas centrifuge technology would also add
to the availability of weapons-grade material. India might
also use unsafeguarded civilian reactors to produce weapons-grade
plutonium. None of these developments is likely in the
near future. Moreover, since the CIRUS production reactor
is reaching the end of its productive life, India's plutonium
production capacity could drop in the near future.
India may be exploring technologies
useful for boosted and thermonuclear weapons. Facilities
near Mysore and at BARC designed to produce lithium and
tritium used in such weapons could be completed. However,
without a significant nuclear test program or information
from a foreign source, India is unlikely to be able to
develop a reliable design for such weapons.
Delivery Systems
India is seeking a diverse force
of dual-purpose missiles and aircraft capable of delivering
nuclear weapons. Currently, India would probably rely
on modern aircraft for nuclear delivery missions. Mirage
2000s are modern aircraft for nuclear delivery missions.
(1.5 lines omitted) Some transport and fighter aircraft
are also available - including the IL-76, An-32, C-130
transports, and the Jaguar and the MIG-29 aircraft. However,
only fighters are likely to prove sufficiently survivable
for such a mission. By the beginning of the next century,
India's inventory of aircraft available for nuclear delivery
is likely to decline. As a result, over the next few years,
India may seek new aircraft to replace its aging inventory.
In addition to modern aircraft,
India is actively developing ballistic missiles able to
deliver nuclear weapons, work on such systems began in
the mid to late 1970s. There are two ballistic missiles
in the Indian program. The first, the Agni medium range
ballistic missile (MRBM), is a two-stage missile, referred
to by India as a "technology demonstrator."
India claims the Agni is capable of carrying a payload
of 1000 kilograms to a range of about 2500 kilometers,
though we believe the range is less. The Agni has been
tested twice unsuccessfully and may not become available
until later this decade. Moreover, the missile may have
insufficient range to reach important targets. Consequently,
the Agni may never be deployed. If it, it may only be
fielded in small numbers. Alternatively, India may use
the Agni as a stepping-stone to develop a missile with
greater range.
The second Indian missile, the Prithvi
short-range ballistic missile (SRBM), may be deployed
with the Army and Air Force units by late 1993 although
it could easily slip until next year. The Prithvi is a
liquid-fueled, mobile single stage missile with a range
of 150 kilometers and a payload of 1000 kilograms; India
has discussed extending the range of the system to 250
kilometers with a decreased payload of 500 kilograms.
The longer-range variant is for use by the Indian Air
Force. The Prithvi will
have a variety of warheads, including
sub-munitions and maybe fuel-air explosives. We do not
know whether it will carry a chemical or nuclear payload.
There appears to be serious opposition to the Prithvi
program by some senior Indian officials given its high
cost, its lack of clear mission, and the declining Indian
defense budget. This may cause even further delays in
deployment of the Prithvi.
India also has a satellite launch
vehicle (SLV) program from which it has transferred some
knowledge and hardware to its ballistic missile program.
For example, the first stage of India's Augmented Space
Launch Vehicle is the same as the first stage of the Agni.
The Indian Space Research Organization is developing two
other SLVs, the Polar Space Launch Vehicle (PSLV) and
the Geosynchronous Space Launch Vehicle (GSLV).
India has been relatively self-sufficient
in ballistic missile and nuclear development efforts.
It has acquired foreign technology in the past, principally
in areas such as missile guidance and control and missile
test tracking equipment for its space launch vehicle program.
Presently, New Delhi has contracted with Russia for cryogenic
engine technology for its GSLV. As mandated by legislation,
the U.S. has sanctioned entities in both nations for this
transaction. (Nuclear procurement efforts may be increasing
because of various problems India is encountering in its
program.)
India may attempt to build a more
survivable, flexible, longer-ranged force of delivery
systems over the next decade. But India will need new
aircraft given the increasing obsolescence of those available
to it for nuclear missions, and New Delhi may have trouble
finding willing suppliers given its Nuclear program. As
a result, missiles may increasingly become the delivery
system of choice. These systems are likely to be mobile,
immune to defenses and have longer-ranges, enabling India
to strike at a growing number of targets.
The Agni : Fact Sheet 