A question for South Block: Can we be in Afghanistan without our own military back-up?
By: Ajai Shukla (The Indian Express)

The abduction and murder of a Border Roads driver, Ramankutty Maniyappan, illustrates the pitfalls of providing even non-military aid to an unsettled Afghanistan.The killing raises the question of workers’ safety, though not in the way that the murderers seek to impose. Instead, India must consider whether it should remain locked into a pure donor-receiver relationship with Afghanistan or whether it must shed its deliberately passive profile, move armed detachments for the security of its aid personnel and, ultimately, colour Afghanistan policy with a strategic dimension.

Changing tack on international strategy is always difficult, especially when it concerns an already successful relationship. And there is broad agreement that New Delhi has consistently hit the bulls-eye in forging a relationship with post-Taliban Afghanistan.

From the start, India acted with sensitivity and decisiveness. Immediate aid after Kabul was captured in November 2001, Indian intervention took the form of non-threatening humanitarian supplies, delivered in Indian Air Force planes. New Delhi played an important role at the Bonn Conference in forging a post-Taliban dispensation. India’s aid to Afghanistan has now crossed 500 million dollars, the largest such programme to any country ever. Relief projects have been carefully directed, spread across provinces and major ethnic groups.

Leveraging the goodwill generated through aid, New Delhi has gained political ground as well. Defusing Pakistani pressure, canalised through the US, Indian consulates function in Jalalabad, Kandahar and Mazar-e-Sharif. India successfully straddles the gulf between the Tajik-dominated Northern Alliance and the Hamid Karzai alliance that replaced it in Kabul, retaining trust with both sides. Relationships are also being forged with the diverse leaders and commanders thrown up by elections in Afghanistan. Sitting in the same Wolesi Jirga or Parliament today are Taliban commander Mullah Rocketi, Panjsheri leader Yunus Qanooni, former communist General Noorul Haq Alomi and technocrat Qayum Karzai. For serious influence, or in an event like an abduction, dialogue rests on functional links with a range of people on the ground.

The tight-rope walk inside Afghanistan is matched by a precarious regional balance, where India must consider the sensitivities of Russia and China as well as America. In the wake of 9/11, the US angrily stormed into the Russian backyard in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan — “all those tans” as Bush famously called them — but the local welcome has run dry. The reason is two-fold: a reassertion of Russian and Chinese assertiveness, through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and also the new American proclivity to support democratic revolutions in the post-Soviet states.

The result: this week the last Americans flew out of the Khanabad Air Base in Uzbekistan in a C-17 Globemaster aircraft; President Islam Karimov had ordered the US out after Washington criticised his suppression of the Andijan rebellion in May. Uzbekistan has now signed a mutual defence pact with Russia. Tajikistan and Turkmenistan too are back to the Russian fold. US presence in Kyrgyzstan is in trouble too. Afghanistan is the only regional country that welcomes the Americans.

In these shifting sands around and inside Afghanistan, India must endow its presence with its own stability. If New Delhi remains in its comfort zone, basking in the Kautilyan comfort of having “done in” Pakistan in its former backyard, time and events could quickly overtake Afghanistan policy. Aid workers are the mainstay of India’s presence in Afghanistan and that presence will be increasingly targeted. Relying on overstretched Afghan security is insufficient; India must send security detachments if necessary. This does not mean a new armed provocation on the ground; the Border Roads detachment building the Delaram-Zaranj road is itself an army unit. A detachment of paramilitary troops already protects India’s embassy in Kabul.

An armed Indian military presence, it is true, will whittle down the advantages of a purely humanitarian image. But such an image is perhaps over-valued in New Delhi. In a neighbourhood as rough as southern Afghanistan, nobody functions without assured security. It would be unfair to ask Indian workers to face those risks and most Afghan local commanders and shooras realise that. It is vital to prevent a domestic backlash against India’s presence in Afghanistan; a series of incidents involving Indian workers will precipitate a chorus to pull out the innocents.

But several conditions would need to be met before India can create an armed profile in Afghanistan. The first is a consensus between the powers in the region: Russia, China and the US. The first two will come to terms with a greater Indian role in Afghanistan, especially if it means a reduced American presence. US consent would be vital for India and its present opposition temporary. Its heavy investment in General Musharraf notwithstanding, Washington needs help in reducing its presence in Afghanistan. NATO’s additional commitment of 6,000 soldiers is not enough. An Indian presence, to look after its own workers, is promising enough for the US to get it past Pakistan.

The most important pre-requisite, however, would be a broad consensus amongst the major players in the fractured Afghan polity. There are four major groups: the Afghan government, the major ethnic groupings like the Northern Alliance, the splintered Pashtun groups and, finally, the so-called “unreformed Taliban”. Serious opposition to an Indian presence is likely only from the Taliban. There are traditional links with the ethnic spectrum, from the Northern Alliance to the fragmented Pashtun tribal commanders, all of whom benefit from Indian aid projects. A robust Indian presence would be acceptable to them. In casual chats, Afghans often ask (usually in the context of Pakistan) why India, with all its power, is so reluctant to use it. The danger of provoking Afghan resentment through an armed Indian presence is often over-estimated.

It is often argued that India must stay away from the chaos of Afghanistan. But the reality is that in most places in Afghanistan, the locals find their lives returning to normal. On most highways, traffic moves without being extorted from. Afghans are voting, even protesting. Hamid Karzai’s constant refrain about Afghanistan descending into chaos reflects his need to keep on his side the international community. But while the surface boils the stream flows placidly under water.

A major drive is on to bring the Taliban on board. Hamid Karzai has offered an amnesty if the Taliban joins talks with the government. The Pakistan-based Taliban spokesperson, Abdul Hai Mutmaen, has rejected his offer but, in Afghanistan, hundreds of Taliban have switched sides over the last year, taking advantage of the Independent Commission for Peace and National Reconciliation. There is a realisation in Kabul and within moderate factions of the Taliban, that a mutually acceptable solution could be in the offing.

There is already a military dimension to India’s relations with Afghanistan. Three hundred military trucks have been gifted to the Afghan Army, which is now considering sending its officers to India for training. The relationship between security advisors is up and running. But it would be unnecessary, and needlessly provocative, for India to think of establishing permanent or semi-permanent bases in Afghanistan. The objective should be no moe than a medium-term armed presence to protect Indian assets and aid personnel, critical to India’s role in that country. Showing the flag as a regional power would be an incidental benefit.

The writer is a Consulting Editor for NDTV