Col N Bhatnagar (Retd) (Central Chronicle)

The growing trend of writing memoirs and blaming others is a dangerous game that great men are indulging in, This media hype, except, helping these authors in earning revenue, serves no other purpose and therefore such books should not be taken seriously. They have no learning value at all. Gen Malik, Musharaff and John Wright have written their memoirs then why should Air Marshal Tipnis lag behind?
The wars today cannot be won purely by the dogged bravery and chivalry of the Infantry or Armoured corps or Air Force. The entire war resources available with the country have to be synergised by taking into account their operational capabilities and limitations. It was with this view of achieving integration amongst the different wings of Armed Forces that the National Defence Academy (NDA) and other such Joint Service establishments were created.

It is quite natural for the Air Force and Army to have different views on the operational employment of various weapon systems. Every fighting machine has its own unique characteristics; capabilities and limitations and every Commander at senior level is expected to understand those, thus to assume that the senior top brass of Indian Army does not understand the basis of employment of various fighting machines would be grossly wrong. Take for instance the tanks with the Indian Army; A tank although has tremendous cross country mobility as compared to trucks but it's a sitting duck in a minefield, it can not wade through steep gradients of even sand dunes. Therefore, while planning its employment during operations, its capabilities and restrictions are taken into consideration.

Similarly, an aircraft flying at a speed, which is even more than the speed of sound, has certain limitations along with capabilities. An aircraft flying at such speed will have difficulty in sighting small targets and also will find it difficult to fly in high altitude areas, amidst huge cliffs where it will also be vulnerable to small arms fire. The Air force therefore always resents the idea of making its resources available for providing Close Air Support to the ground troops as they feel that the Air force resources are not being optimally utilized. They would rather employ their machine against strategic targets such as Rail yards, Bridges, airfields etc.

However, this difference of opinion over the employment of resources; tanks, artillery, mechanized infantry, artillery guns takes place even within the Army. The officers of these corps often have to argue with the commanders on the issue of their appropriate employment during operations. At times even an assessment of a commander may go absolutely wrong, for instance, the Brigade Commander during the famous battle of Longewala in 1971 had ruled out the employment of tanks by Pak Army in his Brigade sector as it was tactically not feasible due to the terrain constraints and that's why there were no anti-tank guns deployed at Longewala and it was after a heated debate with CO of Punjab Battalion whose one company was at Longewala that the Anti-tank guns were moved to the post when enemy's tanks had almost surrounded the post. Does that mean that Col Kuldip Singh Chandpure should question the tactical assessment of the then Brigade Commander? Even as late as 1987, the tank threat in Longewala was considered negligible due to terrain constraints.

The Air Force therefore like the tank man and the gunner will also have a difference of opinion on various issues of operational employment. However, notwithstanding the genuine operational limitations, at times, these limitations are overplayed by these specialized forces advisors/commanders. For instance, if the GoC were to employ tanks in an assault role, the tank man would talk of its inability to move through the minefield, or its inability to climb the gradient as it is slightly steep etc etc and argue that tanks cannot be employed in assault role.

Thus, when a tank man can at times, afford to overplay the limitations of his machine even being part of army why can't Air Force do it. Each commander looks at the battle with his own angle and perception. If the terrorists have infiltrated and occupied certain important heights, then it is the Army's battle and not The Air force problem. The disadvantages of employing Air force at those heights will be highlighted and the endeavour would be to keep the Air Force out of it, like a tank man would do wherever possible. The Kargil battle therefore was Army's responsibility and IAF top bras was there in the Operation's room only to suggest how best he can help the Army to dislodge the terrorists from those heights.

The army has very intelligently overcome this problem to achieve integration at all levels. For instance, it has provided to the Infantry Division an integral armoured unit as well as other specialized units to ensure better integration at the operational level. It has also catered for advisors of specialized units at appropriate levels. By ensuring that the GoC or the commander responsible for the operational planning and its implementation will write the ACR (Confidential Reports) of all these fellows commanding the specialized units, the chances of over playing the limitations are reduced to quite an extent.

The army has for a number of years been trying to achieve this with the Air Force as well. A few attack helicopters if placed under army command can achieve great success against terrorists as well as during conventional war when employed along with armour. However, just because it is a flying machine the Air Force is adamant and does not want to part with it. Not realising that even Americans have used these attack helicopters against the terrorists very effectively in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is not understood, then why is Air force fights shy of using these against the terrorists in India. Why always over play the disadvantages and the limitations?

If an aircraft and a helicopter were lost in Kargil then Army also lost almost 800 men and double that were injured and some of them have become physically handicapped for ever. Probably, had the attack were properly employed along with artillery the casualties could have been reduced.

Neither the Army alone nor the Air Force by itself can win a war as we are neither as powerful as US nor our adversary is as weak as Iraq. Hence, to take the lessons of US-Iraq war very seriously will not be correct. The NDA and Staff College Training, quite evidently have failed to achieve the integration at the highest level and therefore, the government must act against all the lobbying and place as per the operational requirements some AF resources-attack copters under command Army permanently till the issue of Chief of Staff Committee is resolved.